diplomacy or war; we are not strong enough to do so alone; therefore we must have allies.  There was no sure alliance to be had in Germany; he despised the other German States.  If there were to be a war he would rather have them against him than on his side.  He must find help abroad; Austria had overcome Prussia by the alliance with Russia.  Surely the only thing to be done was to seek support where it could be got, either with Russia or with France, if possible with both.  In this he was only reverting to the old policy of Prussia; the alliance with Austria had only begun in 1813.  From now until 1866 his whole policy was ceaselessly devoted to bringing about such a disposition of the forces of Europe that Austria might be left without allies and Prussia be able to regain the upper hand in German affairs.

The change was in his circumstances, not in his character; as before he was moved by a consuming passion of patriotism; something there was too of personal feeling,—­his own pride, his own ambitions were engaged, though this was as nothing compared to love of his country and loyalty to the King.  He was a soldier of the Prussian Crown:  at Berlin he had to defend it against internal enemies; now the danger had shifted, the power of the Government was established, why waste time in fighting with Liberalism?  Other enemies were pressing on.  When Jellachich and Windischgaetz had stood victorious by the blood-stained altar of St. Stephen’s, the Austrian army had destroyed the common foe; now it was the same Austrian army and Austrian statesmen who desired to put a limit to Prussian ambition.  Bismarck threw himself into the conflict of diplomacy with the same courage and relentless persistence that he had shewn in Parliamentary debates.  He had already begun to divine that the time might come when the Prussian Crown would find an ally in Italian patriots and Hungarian rebels.

It was the Eastern complications which first enabled him to shew his diplomatic abilities in the larger field of European politics.  The plans for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire which were entertained by the Czar were opposed by England, France, and Austria; Prussia, though not immediately concerned, also at first gave her assent to the various notes and protests of the Powers; so that the ambition of the Czar was confronted by the unanimous voice of Europe.

Bismarck from the beginning regarded the situation with apprehension; he saw that Prussia was being entangled in a struggle in which she had much to lose and nothing to gain.  If she continued to support the Western Powers she would incur the hatred of Russia; then, perhaps, by a sudden change of policy on the part of Napoleon, she would be left helpless and exposed to Russian vengeance.  If war were to break out, and Prussia took part in the war, then the struggle between France and Russia would be fought out on German soil, and, whoever was victorious, Germany would be the loser.  What interests of theirs were at stake