whole negotiations worked behind the scenes, smoothing away difficulties, thereupon drafted a letter which he sent by special messenger to the King of Bavaria.  The King at once adopted it, copied it out and signed it, and at the same time wrote another letter to the other princes, asking them to join in the request which he had made to the King of Prussia, to assume the title of Emperor which had been in abeyance for over sixty years.  So it came about that the letter by which the offer to the King was made had really emanated from his own Chancellor.  It shews to what good purpose Bismarck used the confidence which, by his conduct in the previous negotiations, the King of Bavaria had been led to place in him.

On the 18th of January, 1871, in the Palace of Versailles, the King publicly assumed the new title; a few days later Bismarck was raised to the rank of Prince.

A few days later Paris fell; the prolonged siege was over and the power of resistance exhausted; then again, as three months before, Favre asked for an audience, this time to negotiate the capitulation of the city; we need not here dwell on the terms of the capitulation—­we need only quote what Favre himself says of Bismarck’s attitude: 

“I should be unfaithful to truth if I did not recognise that in these mournful discussions I always found the Chancellor eager to soften in form the cruelty of his requirements.  He applied himself as much as was possible to temper the military harshness of the general staff, and on many points he consented to make himself the advocate of our demands.”

A few weeks were allowed for elections to be held and an assembly to meet at Bordeaux, and then once more M. Thiers appeared, to negotiate the terms of peace.  He knew that the demands would be very heavy; he anticipated that they would be asked to surrender Alsace, including Belfort, and of Lorraine at least the department of the Moselle, with Metz; he expected a large war indemnity—­five thousand million francs.  The terms Bismarck had to offer were almost identical with these, except that the indemnity was placed at six thousand million francs.  The part Thiers had to play was a very difficult one; he knew that if Germany insisted on her full demands he must accept; he was too experienced a politician to be misled by any of the illusions under which Favre had laboured.  He, as all other Frenchmen, had during the last three months learned a bitter lesson.  “Had we made peace,” he said, “before the fall of Metz, we might at least have saved Lorraine.”  He hoped against hope that he might still be able to do so.  With all the resources of his intellect and his eloquence he tried to break down the opposition of the Count.  When Metz was refused to him then he pleaded for Belfort.  Let us hear what Favre, who was present at the decisive interview, tells us; we may use his authority with more confidence that he was a silent and passive auditor.