Bismarck would at this time willingly have made peace, but there was no opportunity of opening negotiations and it is doubtful whether even his influence would have been able successfully to combat the desire of the army to march on Paris.  On September 4th, the march, which had been interrupted ten days before, was begun.  Immediately afterwards news came which stopped all hopes of a speedy peace.  How soon was his warning as to the instability of French Governments to be fulfilled!  A revolution had broken out in Paris, the dethronement of the Emperor had been proclaimed, and a Provisional Government instituted.  They at once declared that they were a government of national defence, they would not rest till the invaders were driven from the land, they appealed to the memories of 1792.  They were indeed ready to make peace, for the war, they said, had been undertaken not against France but against the Emperor; the Emperor had fallen, a free France had arisen; they would make peace, but they would not yield an inch of their country or a stone of their fortresses.  With great energy they prepared the defence of Paris and the organisation of new armies; M. Thiers was instructed to visit the neutral Courts and to beg for the support of Europe.

Under these circumstances it was Bismarck’s duty to explain the German view; he did so in two circular notes of September 13th and September 16th.  He began by expounding those principles he had already expressed to Wimpffen, principles which had already been communicated by his secretaries to the German Press and been repeated in almost every paper of the country.  The war had not been caused by the Emperor; it was the nation which was responsible for it.  It had arisen from the intolerance of the French character, which looked on the prosperity of other nations as an insult to themselves.  They must expect the same feeling to continue: 

“We cannot seek guarantees for the future in French feeling.  We must not deceive ourselves; we must soon expect a new attack; we cannot look forward to a lasting peace, and this is quite independent of the conditions we might impose on France.  It is their defeat which the French nation will never forgive.  If now we were to withdraw from France without any accession of territory, without any contribution, without any advantage but the glory of our arms, there would remain in the French nation the same hatred, the same spirit of revenge, for the injury done to their vanity and to their love of power.”

Against this they must demand security; the demand was addressed not to any single Government but to the nation as a whole; South Germany must be protected from the danger of French attack; they would never be safe so long as Strasburg and Metz were in French hands; Strasburg was the gate of Germany; restored to Germany, these cities would regain their defensive character.  Twenty times had France made war on Germany, but from Germany no danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe was to be feared.