Ever since the conclusion of peace, the danger of a conflict between France and Germany had been apparent.  It was not only the growing discontent and suspicion of the French nation and the French army, who truly felt that the supremacy of France had been shaken by the growth of this new power; it was not only that the deep-rooted hatred of France which prevailed in Germany had been stirred by Napoleon’s action, and that the Germans had received confidence from the consciousness of their own strength.  Had there been nothing more than this, year after year might have gone by and, as has happened since and had happened before, a war always anticipated might have been always deferred.  We may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone to war unless he believed it to be necessary and desirable, and he would not have thought this unless there was something to be gained.  He has often shewn, before and since, that he was quite as well able to use his powers in the maintenance of peace as in creating causes for war.  There was, however, one reason which made war almost inevitable.  The unity of Germany was only half completed; the southern States still existed in a curious state of semi-isolation.  This could not long continue; their position must be regulated.  War arises from that state of uncertainty which is always present when a political community has not found a stable and permanent constitution.  In Germany men were looking forward to the time when the southern States should join the north.  The work was progressing; the treaties of offensive and defensive alliance had been followed by the creation of a new Customs’ Union, and it was a further step when at Bismarck’s proposal a Parliament consisting of members elected throughout the whole of Germany was summoned at Berlin for the management of matters connected with the tariff.  Further than this, however, he was not able to go; the new Constitution was working well; they could risk welcoming the States of the south into it; but this could not be done without a war with France.  Bismarck had rejected the French proposal for an alliance.  He knew, and everyone else knew, that France would oppose by the sword any attempt to complete the unity of Germany; and, which was more serious, unless great caution was used, that she would be supported by Austria and perhaps by the anti-Prussian party in Bavaria.  There were some who wished to press it forward at once.  Bismarck was very strongly pressed by the National Liberals to hasten the union with the south; at the beginning of 1870 the Grand Duke of Baden, himself a son-in-law of the King of Prussia and always the chief supporter of Prussian influence in the south, formally applied to be admitted into the Federation.  The request had to be refused, but Bismarck had some difficulty in defending his position against his enthusiastic friends.  He had to warn them not to hurry; they must not press the development too quickly.  If they did so, they would stir the resentment of the anti-Prussian party; they would play into the hands of Napoleon and Austria.  But if there was danger in haste, there was equal danger in delay; the prestige of Prussia would suffer.