and Luxemburg, and if it seemed desirable he should offer that Antwerp be made a free city; by this perhaps the extreme hostility of England would be averted.  With this demand, on August 20th, he again appeared before Bismarck.  Of course, the Minister, as soon as Saarbrueck and Landau were mentioned, drew himself up to his full height, adopted an angry air, and reminded Benedetti of his repeated declaration that they were not going to give up a single German village.  Benedetti, therefore, in accordance with his instructions, withdrew this clause.  The rest of the treaty he and Bismarck discussed together carefully; they took it line by line and clause by clause, Bismarck dealing with the matter in a serious and practical manner.  After this had been finished a revised draft was written out by Benedetti, Bismarck dictating to him the alterations which had been made.  This revised draft consisted of five articles:  (1) The Emperor recognised the recent acquisitions of Prussia; (2) the King of Prussia should bind himself to assist France in acquiring Luxemburg from the King of Holland by purchase or exchange; (3) the Emperor bound himself not to oppose a union of the North German Federation with the South German States and the establishment of a common Parliament; (4) if the Emperor at any time wished to acquire Belgium, the King of Prussia was to support him and give him military assistance against the interference of any other Power; (5) a general treaty of alliance.

It will be seen that this treaty consists of two parts.  The first refers to what has already taken place,—­the Emperor of the French in return for past assistance is to have Luxemburg; this part would naturally come into operation immediately.  The next two clauses referred to the future; the union of all Germany would in the natural course of events not be long delayed; this would seriously alter the balance of power and weaken France.  Napoleon would naturally in the future use all his efforts to prevent it, as he had done during this year, and by an alliance with Austria he would probably be able to do so.  He would, however, withdraw his opposition if he was allowed to gain a similar increase of territory for France.  After all, the acquisition of at least part of Belgium by France might be justified by the same arguments by which the dethronement of the King of Hanover was defended.  Many of the Belgians were French; there was no natural division between Belgium and France; probably the people would offer no opposition.

Bismarck had to remember that he could not complete the union of Germany without considering Napoleon; there were only two ways of doing the work, (1) by war with France, (2) by an alliance.  Need we be surprised that he at least considered whether the latter would not be the safer, the cheaper, and the more humane?  Was it not better to complete the work by the sacrifice of Belgian independence rather than by the loss of 300,000 lives?