stress on the annexations in North Germany; Benedetti, so little did he follow Napoleon’s thought, protested warmly against this.  “We are not,” he said, “in the times of Frederick the Great.”  Bismarck then tried to probe him on other matters; as before, he assumed that Napoleon’s support and good-will were not to be had for nothing.  He took it as a matter of course that if France was friendly to Prussia, she would require some recompense.  He had already instructed Goltz to enquire what non-German compensation would be asked; he was much disturbed when Benedetti met his overtures with silence; he feared that Napoleon had some other plan.  Benedetti in his report writes: 

“Without any encouragement on my part, he attempted to prove to me that the defeat of Austria permitted France and Prussia to modify their territorial limits and to solve the greater part of the difficulties which continued to menace the peace of Europe.  I reminded him that there were treaties and that the war which he desired to prevent would be the first result of a policy of this kind.  M. de Bismarck answered that I misunderstood him, that France and Prussia united and resolved to rectify their respective countries, binding themselves by solemn engagements henceforth to regulate together these questions, need not fear any armed resistance either from England or from Russia.”

What was Bismarck’s motive in making these suggestions and enquiries?  German writers generally take the view that he was not serious in his proposal, that he was deliberately playing with Napoleon, that he wished to secure from him some compromising document which he might then be able, as, in fact, was to happen, to use against him.  They seem to find some pleasure in admiring him in the part of Agent provocateur.  Perhaps we may interpret his thought rather differently.  We have often seen that it was not his practice to lay down a clear and definite course of action, but he met each crisis as it occurred.  The immediate necessity was to secure the friendship of France; believing, as he did, that in politics no one acted simply on principle or out of friendship, he assumed that Napoleon, who had control of the situation, would not give his support unless he had the promise of some important recompense.  The natural thing for him, as he always preferred plain dealing, was to ask straight out what the Emperor wanted.  When the answer came, then fresh questions would arise; if it was of such a kind that Bismarck would be able to accept it, a formal treaty between the two States might be made; if it was more than Bismarck was willing to grant, then there would be an opportunity for prolonging negotiations with France, and haggling over smaller points, and he would be able to come to some agreement with Austria quickly.  If he could not come to any agreement with France, and war were to break out, he would always have this advantage, that he would be able to make it appear that the cause of war arose