Austria; Bismarck did not mind that, because what was pleasant to France was convenient to him.  He knew also that the proposal to annex the conquered territories would be very agreeable to Napoleon; the dethronement of old-established dynasties might be regarded as a delicate compliment to the principles he had always maintained and to the traditional policy of his house.  If, however, we wish to find Bismarck’s own motives, we must remember that before the war broke out he had in his mind some such division of Germany; he knew that it would be impossible at once to unite the whole in a firm union.  If Bavaria were to be included in the new Confederation they would lose in harmony what they gained in extent.  As he said in his drastic way: 

“We cannot use these Ultramontanes, and we must not swallow more than we can digest.  We will not fall into the blunder of Piedmont, which has been more weakened than strengthened by the annexation of Naples.”

Of course he could not express this openly, and even now German writers obscure the thought, for in Germany, as in Italy, the desire for unity was so powerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman who did not take the most immediate path to this result.  It was fortunate for Germany that Bismarck was strong enough not to do so, for the Confederation of the north could be founded and confirmed before the Catholic and hostile south was included.  The prize was in his hands; he deliberately refused to pick it up.

Supposing, however, that, after all, France would not accept the terms he suggested—­during the anxious days which passed, this contingency was often before him.  It was not till the 14th that Goltz was able to send him any decisive information, for the very good reason that Napoleon had not until then made up his own mind.  Bismarck’s anxiety was increased by the arrival of Benedetti.  He had received instructions to follow the King, and, after undergoing the discomfort of a hasty journey in the rear of the Prussian army, reached headquarters on the 10th at Zwittau.  He was taken straight to Bismarck’s room although it was far on into the night.  He found him sitting in a deserted house, writing, with a large revolver by his side; for as Roon complains, even during the campaign Bismarck would not give up his old custom of working all night and sleeping till midday or later.  Bismarck received the French Ambassador with his wonted cordiality and the conversation was prolonged till three or four o’clock in the morning, and continued on the following days.  Bismarck hoped that he had come with full powers to treat, or at least with full information on the intentions of his Government; that was not the case; he had no instructions except to use his influence to persuade Prussia to moderation; Napoleon was far too much divided in his own mind to be able to tell him anything further.  Bismarck with his usual frankness explained what he wished, laying much