“that the acquisition of the Duchies would only be an earnest for the fulfilment of the pledge which history had laid upon the State of Prussia; for the future prosecution of it we need the most friendly relations with France.  It seems to me in the interest of France to encourage Prussia in the ambitious fulfilment of her national duty.”

The Emperor acquiesced; as we know, the division of Europe into large national States was what he meant by Napoleonic ideas; he was willing enough to help in Germany a change such as that he had brought about in Italy.  It was agreed that events should be allowed to develop themselves; when the time came it would be easy enough to come to some definite agreement.

This however was not all; it was not to be expected that Napoleon should render Prussia so valuable a service without receiving something in exchange; we know Bismarck’s opinion of a statesman who, out of sympathy for another country, would sacrifice the interests of his own.  The creation of a strong consolidated State in the north of Germany could not be in the interests of France; the power of France had always been founded on the weakness of Germany.  Even if Napoleon himself, with his generous and cosmopolitan sympathies, was willing to make the sacrifice, France was not; Napoleon knew, and Bismarck knew, that Napoleon could not disregard the feeling of the country; his power was based on universal suffrage and the popularity of his name; he could not, as a King of Prussia could, brave the displeasure of the people.  France must then have some compensation.  What was it to be?  What were to be the terms of the more intimate and special understanding?  We do not know exactly what was said; we do know that Bismarck led both the Emperor and his Ministers to believe that Prussia would support them in an extension of the frontier.  He clearly stated that the King would not be willing to surrender a single Prussian village; he probably said that they would not acquiesce in the restoration to France of any German territory.  France therefore must seek her reward in a French-speaking people.  It was perhaps an exaggeration if Drouyn de Lhuys said “he offered us all kinds of things which did not belong to him,” but Napoleon also in later years repeated that Bismarck had promised him all kinds of recompenses.  No written agreement was made; that was reserved for later negotiations, but there was a verbal understanding, which both parties felt was binding.  This was the pendant to the interview of Plombieres.  But Bismarck had improved on Cavour’s example; he did not want so much, he asked only for neutrality:  the King of Prussia would not be called upon, like Victor Emmanuel, to surrender the old possessions of his House.

Bismarck returned to Berlin with his health invigorated by the Atlantic winds and his spirits raised by success.  The first step now was to secure the help of Italy; he had seen Nigra, the Italian Minister, at Paris, and told him that war was inevitable; he hoped he could reckon on Italian alliance, but there was still, however, much ground for anxiety that Austria might succeed in arranging affairs with Italy.