Meanwhile the diplomatic difficulties had continued.  There had now come from England the proposal of a Conference.  This Bismarck, always wishing to preserve the appearance of moderation, accepted.  Before doing so, he knew that he had gained a very important ally.  Napoleon was displeased with the English Government; he it was who suggested to Bismarck that the best solution of the difficulty would be the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia.  It was just what Bismarck himself desired.  Would he be able to bring it about?  This was what was in his mind when he had to consider the attitude he should adopt at the Conference.

He could not, of course, propose it openly; he might be able to arrange affairs so that in the universal confusion this solution should be welcomed.  He first of all began to change his attitude towards the German agitation for Augustenburg; hitherto he had opposed and discouraged it; now he let it have free course.  He wrote: 

“The present situation is such that it seems to me desirable to let loose the whole pack against the Danes at the Congress; the joint noise will work in the direction of making the subjugation of the Duchies to Denmark appear impossible to foreigners; they will have to consider programmes which the Prussian Government cannot lay before them.”

What this means is that England and Russia were to be convinced that Denmark could not regain the Duchies; then they would have to consider who should have them.  Bismarck believed that Austria was irrevocably opposed to Augustenburg.  “She would rather see the Duchies in our hands than in those of the Prince,” he wrote.  Austria and Russia would, therefore, oppose this solution; if both Denmark and Augustenburg were impossible, then would be the time for France to ask why should they not be given to Prussia, and to join this proposal with another one for the division of the Duchies according to nationality.

Napoleon, in accordance with his principles, wished entirely to disregard the question of law; he was equally indifferent to the Treaty of London, the hereditary rights of Augustenburg, or the chartered privileges of the Duchies.  He wished to consult the inhabitants and allow each village to vote whether it wished to be German or Danish; thus, districts in the north where Danish was spoken would then be incorporated in Denmark; the whole of Holstein and the south of Schleswig would be permanently united to Germany, and by preference to Prussia.  These revolutionary principles of Napoleon were in the eyes of the Austrian statesmen criminal, for if applied consistently not only would Austria be deprived of Venetia, but the whole Empire would be dissolved.  It required all Bismarck’s ingenuity to maintain the alliance with Austria, which was still necessary to him, and at the same time to keep Napoleon’s friendship by giving his assent to doctrines that would be so convenient to Prussia.

In considering Bismarck’s diplomatic work we must not suppose that he ever deceived himself into thinking that he would be able clearly to foresee all that would happen; he knew too well the uncertain nature of the pieces with which he had to deal:  no one could quite foretell, for instance, the result of the struggle which was going on in the English Ministry or the votes of the House of Commons; equally impossible was it to build on the assurances of Napoleon.