of such ardent debate and such popular enlightenment as were then going forward would have resulted in his defeat.  As it was, nearly every Northern State—­no matter how firm its previous adherence to the Democratic party—­was aroused to a strenuous opposition.  Nearly every Northern State pronounced by a stupendous majority against him and against his cause.  Nothing but a systematic disguise of the true questions at issue by his own party, and a gratuitous complication of the canvass by means of a foolish third party, saved his followers from the most complete and shameful rout that had been given for many years to any political array.  Men of every class, of every shade of faith, joined in that hearty protest against the spirit which animated the Democratic administration, and joined in it, that they might utter the severest rebuke in their power, of its meanness and perfidy.

Mr. Buchanan ought to have read the warning which was thus blazed across the political skies, like the hand-writing upon the wall.  He ought to have discerned in this general movement the signs of a deep, earnest, and irrepressible conviction on the part of the North.  It is no slight cause which can start such general and enthusiastic expressions of popular feeling; they cannot be manufactured; they are not the work of mere party excitement; there is nothing spurious and nothing hollow in them; but they well up from the deep heart of nations, showing that a chord of sympathy has been touched, with which it is fatal to tamper or to sport.  Call it fanaticism, if you will; call it delusion; call it anything; but recollect also that it is out of such feelings that revolutions are born, and by them that awful national crises are determined.

But Mr. Buchanan has not profited, as we shall see, by the monition.  His initial act, the choice of a cabinet, in which the only man of national reputation was superannuated, and the others were of little note, gave small hope that he would do so; and his subsequent mistakes might have been augured from the calibre of the counsellors by whom he chose to be surrounded.—­But let the men pass, since our object is to discuss measures.

The questions with which the President and his cabinet have had to deal, without following them in the order either of time or importance, may be classified as the Mormon question, the Financial question, the Filibuster question, and the Kansas question.  All these required, for a proper adjustment of them, firmness rather than ability,—­a clear perception of the principles of right, rather than abstruse policy,—­and vigor of execution, rather than profound diplomatic skill.  Yet we do not perceive that our government has displayed, in regard to the treatment of any of these questions, either firmness or ability.  It has employed policy enough and diplomacy enough, but the policy has been incoherent and the diplomacy shallow.  At the end of the first year of its rule, the most striking result of its general management is the open defection of many of its most powerful friends, and the increased earnestness and energy of all its foes.