Mr. Payne’s own logic is not very clear.  The ‘primitive logic’ of the savage leads him to seek for a cause or maker of things, which he finds in a great creative spirit.  Yet the lowest savages have no idea even of spirit, and the hunting races, as a rule, have no god.  Does Mr. Payne mean that a great creative spirit is not a god, while a spirit kept on board wages in a tangible object is a god?  We are unable, by reason of evidence later to be given, to agree with Mr. Payne’s view of the facts, while his reasoning appears somewhat inconsistent, the lowest savages having, in his opinion, no idea of spirit, though the idea of a creative spirit is, for all that, one of the earliest efforts of primitive logic.

On any such theories as these the belief in a moral Supreme Being is a very late (or a very early?) result of evolution, due to the action of advancing thought upon the original conception of ghosts.  This opinion of Mr. Im Thurn’s is, roughly stated, the usual theory of anthropologists.  We wish, on the other hand, to show that the idea of God, as he is conceived of by our inquiring plain man, is shadowed forth (among contradictory fables) in the lowest-known grades of savagery, and therefore cannot arise from the later speculation of men, comparatively civilised and advanced, on the original datum of ghosts.  We shall demonstrate, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Spencer, Mr. Huxley, and even Mr. Tylor, that the Supreme Being, and, in one case at least, the casual sprites of savage faith, are active moral influences.  What is even more important, we shall make it undeniable that Anthropology has simplified her problem by neglecting or ignoring her facts.  While the real problem is to account for the evolution out of ghosts of the eternal, creative moral god of the ‘plain man,’ the germ of such a god or being in the creeds of the lowest savages is by anthropologists denied, or left out of sight, or accounted for by theories contradicted by facts, or, at best, is explained away as a result of European or Islamite influences.  Now, as the problem is to account for the evolution of the highest conception of God, as far as that conception exists among the most backward races, the problem can never be solved while that highest conception of God is practically ignored.

Thus, anthropologists, as a rule, in place of facing and solving their problem, have merely evaded it—­doubtless unwittingly.  This, of course, is not the practice of Mr. Tylor, though even his great work is professedly much more concerned with the development of the idea of spirit and with the lower forms of animism than with the real crux—­the evolution of the idea (always obscured by mythology) of a moral, uncreated, undying God among the lowest savages.  This negligence of anthropologists has arisen from a single circumstance.  They take it for granted that God is always (except where the word for God is applied to a living human being) regarded as Spirit.  Thus, having accounted for the development of the idea of spirit, they regard God as that idea carried to its highest power, and as the final step in its evolution.  But, if we can show that the early idea of an undying, moral, creative being does not necessarily or logically imply the doctrine of spirit (or ghost), then this idea of an eternal, moral, creative being may have existed even before the doctrine of spirit was evolved.