There exists a current notion to the effect that, since the private class is raised in the legislature to a participation in the universal cause, it must appear in the form of individuals—­either that representatives are chosen for the function, or that every individual exercises a vote.  This abstract atomic view prevails neither in the family nor in civic society, in both of which the individual appears only as a member of a universal.  The State, however, is in essence an organization of members, and these members are themselves spheres; in it no element shall show itself as an unorganized mass.  The many, as individuals, whom one chooses to call the people, are indeed a collection, but only as a multitude, a formless mass, whose movement and action would be elemental, irrational, savage, and terrible.

The concrete State is the whole, organized into its particular spheres, and the member of the State is a member of such a particular class.  Only in this objective determination can the individual find recognition in the State.  Only in his cooeperate capacity, as member of the community and the like, can the individual first find a real and vital place in the universal.  It remains, of course, open to him to rise through his skill to any class for which he can qualify himself, including even the universal class.

It is a matter of great advantage to have among the delegates representatives of every special branch of society, such as trade, manufacture, etc.—­individuals thoroughly familiar with their branch and belonging to it.  In the notion of a loose and indefinite election this important matter is left to accident; every branch, however, has the same right to be represented as every other.  To view the delegates as representatives has, then, an organic and rational meaning only if they are not representatives of mere individuals, of the mere multitude, but of one of the essential spheres of society and of its large interests.  Representation thus no longer means substitution of one person by another, but it means, rather, that the interest itself is actually present in the representative.

Of the elections by many separate individuals it may be observed that there is necessarily an indifference, especially in large States, about using one’s vote, since one vote is of such slight importance; and those who have the right to vote will not do so, no matter how much one may extol the privilege of voting.  Hence this institution turns into the opposite of what it stands for.  The election becomes the business of a few, of a single party, of a special interest, which should, in fact, be neutralized.

Through the publicity of the assembly of classes public opinion first acquires true thoughts and an insight into the condition and the notion of the State and its affairs, and thus develops the capacity of judging more rationally concerning them; it learns, furthermore, to know and respect the routine, talents, virtues, and skill of the authorities and officers of the State.  While publicity stimulates these talents in their further development and incites their honorable display, it is also an antidote for the pride of individuals and of the multitude, and is one of the greatest opportunities for their education.