or kind in its concrete development.  But it must especially be observed that the above mentioned divisions admit of a multitude of particular modifications—­not only such as lie within the limits of those classes themselves but also such as are mixtures of several of these essentially distinct classes and which are consequently misshapen, unstable, and inconsistent forms.  In such a collision, the concerning question is:  What is the best constitution—­that is, by what arrangement, organization, or mechanism of the power of the State can its object be most surely attained?  This object may indeed be variously understood; for instance, as the calm enjoyment of life on part of the citizens, or as universal happiness.  Such aims have suggested the so-called ideals of constitutions, and, as a particular branch of the subject, Ideals of the education of princes (Fenelon), or of the governing body, the aristocracy at large (Plato); for the chief point they treat of is the condition of those subjects who stand at the head of affairs, and in these ideals the concrete details of political organization are not at all considered.  The inquiry into the best constitution is frequently treated as if not only the theory were an affair of subjective independent conviction, but as if the introduction of a constitution recognized as the best, or as superior to others, could be the result of a resolve adopted in this theoretical manner, as if the form of a constitution were a matter of free choice, determined by nothing else but reflection.  Of this artless fashion was that deliberation—­not indeed of the Persian people, but of the Persian grandees, who had conspired to overthrow the pseudo-Smerdis and the Magi, after their undertaking had succeeded and when there was no scion of the royal family living—­as to what constitution they should introduce into Persia; and Herodotus gives an equally naive account of this deliberation.

In the present day, the constitution of a country and people is not represented as so entirely dependent on free and deliberate choice.  The fundamental, but abstractly and therefore imperfectly, entertained conception of freedom, has resulted in the republic being very generally regarded—­in theory—­as the only just and true political constitution.  Even many who occupy elevated official positions under monarchical constitutions, so far from being opposed to this idea are actually its supporters; only they see that such a constitution, though the best, cannot be realized under all circumstances, and that, while men are what they are, we must be satisfied with less freedom, the monarchical constitution, under the given circumstances and the present moral condition of the people, being even regarded as the most advantageous.  In this view also the necessity of a particular constitution is made to depend on the condition of the people as though the latter were non-essential and accidental.  This representation is founded on the distinction