These observations may suffice in reference to the means which the World-Spirit uses for realizing its Idea.  Stated simply and abstractly, this mediation involves the activity of personal existences in whom Reason is present as their absolute, substantial being, but a basis, in the first instance, still obscure and unknown to them.  But the subject becomes more complicated and difficult when we regard individuals not merely in their aspect of activity, but more concretely, in conjunction with a particular manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality—­forms of existence which are intimately connected with Reason and share in its absolute claims.  Here the relation of mere means to an end disappears, and the chief bearings of this seeming difficulty in reference to the absolute aim of Spirit have been briefly considered.

(3) The third point to be analyzed is, therefore:  What is the object to be realized by these means—­that is, What is the form it assumes in the realm of reality?  We have spoken of means; but, in carrying out of a subjective, limited aim, we have also to take into consideration the element of a material either already present or which has to be procured.  Thus the question would arise:  What is the material in which the Ideal of Reason is wrought out?  The primary answer would be:  Personality itself, human desires, subjectivity generally.  In human knowledge and volition as its material element Reason attains positive existence.  We have considered subjective volition where it has an object which is the truth and essence of reality—­viz., where it constitutes a great world-historical passion.  As a subjective will, occupied with limited passions, it is dependent, and can gratify its desires only within the limits of this dependence.  But the subjective will has also a substantial life, a reality, in which it moves in the region of essential being and has the essential itself as the object of its existence.  This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational will; it is the moral whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the whole.  And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common will, as if this were a means provided for its benefit, as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation, the mutual constraint of all, might secure a small space of liberty for each.  Rather, we affirm, are law, morality, government, and these alone, the positive reality and completion of freedom.  Freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice, which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.