ethics, religion.  That is to say, man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the Divine that is in him—­the quality that was designated at the outset as Reason, which, in view of its activity and power of self-determination, was called freedom.  And we affirm—­without entering at present on the proof of the assertion—­that religion, morality, etc., have their foundation and source in that principle, and so are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance.  And here we must remark that individuals, to the extent of their freedom, are responsible for the depravation and enfeeblement of morals and religion.  This is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man—­that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his destiny is his very ability to will either good or evil—­in one word, that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not only of evil, but of good, and not only concerning this or that particular matter, and all that happens ab extra, but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom.  The brute alone is simply innocent.  It would, however, demand an extensive explanation—­as extensive as the analysis of moral freedom itself—­to preclude or obviate all the misunderstandings which the statement that what is called innocence imports the entire unconsciousness of evil—­is wont to occasion.

In contemplating the fate which virtue, morality, even piety experience in history, we must not fall into the Litany of Lamentations, that the good and pious often, or for the most part, fare ill in the world, while the evil-disposed and wicked prosper.  The term prosperity is used in a variety of meanings—­riches, outward honor, and the like.  But in speaking of something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence, that so-called well or ill faring of these or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential element in the rational order of the universe.  With more justice than happiness—­or a fortunate environment for individuals—­it is demanded of the grand aim of the world’s existence that it should foster, nay, involve the execution and ratification of good, moral, righteous purposes.  What makes men morally discontented (a discontent, by the way, on which they somewhat pride themselves), is that they do not find the present adapted to the realization of aims which they hold to be right and just—­more especially, in modern times, ideals of political constitutions; they contrast unfavorably things as they are, with their idea of things as they ought to be.  In this case it is not private interest nor passion that desires gratification, but reason, justice, liberty; and, equipped with this title, the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing and readily adopts a position, not merely of discontent, but of open revolt against the actual condition of the world.  To estimate such a feeling and such views aright, the demands insisted upon and the very dogmatic opinions