neither in the deed intrinsically nor in the design
of the man who committed it. But the action has
a further general bearing. In the design of the
doer it was only revenge executed against an individual
in the destruction of his property, but it is, moreover,
a crime, and that involves punishment also. This
may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator,
still less in his intention; but his deed itself, the
general principles it calls into play, its substantial
content, entail it. By this example I wish only
to impress on you the consideration that, in a simple
act, something further may be implicated than lies
in the intention and consciousness of the agent.
The example before us involves, however, the additional
consideration that the substance of the act, consequently,
we may say, the act itself, recoils upon the perpetrator—reacts
upon him with destructive tendency. This union
of the two extremes—the embodiment of a
general idea in the form of direct reality and the
elevation of a speciality into connection with universal
truth—is brought to pass, at first sight,
under the conditions of an utter diversity of nature
between the two and an indifference of the one extreme
toward the other. The aims which the agents set
before them are limited and special; but it must be
remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent
thinking beings. The purport of their desires
is interwoven with general, essential considerations
of justice, good, duty, etc.; for mere desire—volition
in its rough and savage forms—falls not
within the scene and sphere of universal history.
Those general considerations, which form at the same
time a norm for directing aims and actions, have a
determinate purport; for such an abstraction as “good
for its own sake,” has no place in living reality.
If men are to act they must not only intend the Good,
but must have decided for themselves whether this
or that particular thing is a good. What special
course of action, however, is good or not, is determined,
as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life,
by the laws and customs of a State; and here no great
difficulty is presented. Each individual has
his position; he knows, on the whole, what a just,
honorable course of conduct is. As to ordinary,
private relations, the assertion that it is difficult
to choose the right and good—the regarding
it as the mark of an exalted morality to find difficulties
and raise scruples on that score—may be
set down to an evil or perverse will, which seeks to
evade duties not in themselves of a perplexing nature,
or, at any rate, to an idly reflective habit of mind—where
a feeble will affords no sufficient exercise to the
faculties—leaving them therefore to find
occupation within themselves and to expand themselves
on moral self-adulation.