sphere of reality.  That which exists for itself only is a possibility, a potentiality, but it has not emerged into existence.  A second element must be introduced in order to produce actuality—­viz., actuation, realization; and its motive power is the will—­the activity of man in the widest sense.  It is only by this activity that that Idea, as well as abstract characteristics generally, are realized, actualized; for of themselves they are powerless.  The motive power that puts them in operation and gives them determinate existence, is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of man.  That some conception of mine should be developed into act and existence, is my earnest desire; I wish to assert my personality in connection with it; I wish to be satisfied by its execution.  If I am to exert myself for any object, it must in some way or other be my object.  In the accomplishment of such or such designs I must at the same time find my satisfaction; although the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication of results, many of which have no interest for me.  This is the absolute right of personal existence—­to find itself satisfied in its activity and labor.  If men are to interest themselves for anything, they must, so to speak, have part of their existence involved in it and find their individuality gratified by its attainment.  Here a mistake must be avoided.  We intend blame, and justly impute it as a fault, when we say of an individual that he is “interested” (in taking part in such or such transactions)—­that is, seeks only his private advantage.  In reprehending this we find fault with him for furthering his personal aims without any regard to a more comprehensive design, of which he takes advantage to promote his own interest or which, with this view, he even sacrifices.  But he who is active in promoting an object is not simply “interested,” but interested in that object itself.  Language faithfully expresses this distinction.  Nothing therefore happens, nothing is accomplished, unless the individuals concerned seek their own satisfaction in the issue.  They are particular units of society—­that is, they have special needs, instincts, and interests generally, peculiar to themselves.  Among these needs are not only such as we usually call necessities—­the stimuli of individual desire and volition—­but also those connected with individual views and convictions; or—­to use a term expressing less decision—­leanings of opinion, supposing the impulses of reflection, understanding, and reason, to have been awakened.  In these cases people demand, if they are to exert themselves in any direction, that the object should commend itself to them, that, in point of opinion-whether as to its goodness, justice, advantage, profit they should be able to “enter into it” (dabei sein).  This is a consideration of special importance in our age, when people are less than formerly influenced by reliance on others, and by authority; when, on the contrary, they devote their activities to a cause on the ground of their own understanding, their independent conviction and opinion.