This point is most forcibly illustrated by the speeches of Lowndes and Cheves of South Carolina in Congress a few years later, cited by Henry Clay in 1812, in which they very justly say,—­“If England should determine to station permanently on our coast a squadron of twelve ships of the line, she would require for this service thirty-six ships of the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on the passage, and one-third on the station; but that is a force which it has been shown England, with her limited navy, could not spare for the American service.”  For once, at least, two of the gifted sons of South Carolina sustained the views of Massachusetts.  The War of the Revolution and the War of 1812 have both demonstrated that England can maintain no permanent blockade through the winter on our waters, and the largest fleet upon our Atlantic coast during the last war did not exceed twenty sail of armed vessels of all sizes.

Jefferson, in his “Notes on Virginia,” in 1785 had expressed his views on our maritime policy in the following terms:—­

“You ask me what I think of the expediency of encouraging our States to become commercial.  Were I to indulge my own theory, I wish them to practise neither commerce or navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China.”

We have seen the commercial policy of Adams illustrated by the creation of a navy; we now see the anti-commercial theory of Jefferson illustrated by its overthrow.

He was once tempted to concede that we might apply a year’s revenue to a navy, but that year he never designated.  Perhaps, if he could have foreseen the unceremonious way in which a few English frigates have of late years dealt with China, or the facility with which they have compelled her to pay millions for a drug alike pernicious to character and health, or the report of the treaty and tribute dictated from the walls of Pekin,—­or could he have foreseen the progress of Lord Cochrane’s frigates up the Potomac, regardless of his gunboats,—­could he have foreshadowed the conflagration of the Capitol and the exit of the Cabinet,—­he would perhaps have attached more importance to a navy and found less to admire in the policy of China, and doubtless his immediate successor would not have aimed a side-blow at our army and navy, as he did, in suggesting “that the fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace.”

But our country, under Jefferson and Madison, for twelve years adopted the blind policy of China.  The navy was suffered to decay.  In 1807 but one frigate and five sloops-of-war were in commission.  The Federal party, however, although in a weak minority, did not tamely submit to the unhappy policy of Southern statesmen; and individuals even of the dominant party opposed it.  Among these, the late Justice Story, who in 1807 represented the County of Essex in Congress, made an effort for the revival of the navy.  But