“Yes,” said Father Payne, “that is so, in a sense, I admit.  But still, one mustn’t shelter oneself behind big words unless one is certain that they mean exactly the same to one’s opponent.  When I was at school there was a master who used to be fond, as he said, of putting the boys on their honour:  but he never asked if we accepted the obligation.  If I say, ’I give you my honour not to do a thing,’ then I can be called dishonourable if I don’t do it; but you can’t put me on my honour unless I consent.”

“But surely honour means something quite definite?” said Lestrange.

“Tell me what it is, then,” said Father Payne.  “Rose, you seem to have ideas on the subject.  What do you mean by honour?”

“Isn’t it one of the ultimate things,” said Rose, “which can’t be defined, but which everyone recognises—­like blue and green, let me say, or sweet and bitter?”

“No,” said Father Payne; “at least I don’t think so.  It seems to me rather an artificial thing, because it varies at different dates.  It used, not so long ago, to be considered an affair of honour to fight a duel with a man if he threw a glass of wine in your face.  And what do you make of the old proverb, ‘All is fair in love and war’?  That seems to mean that honour is not a universal obligation.  Then there’s the phrase, ’Honour among thieves,’ which isn’t a very exalted one; or the curious thing, schoolboy honour, which dictates that a boy may know that another boy is being disgracefully and cruelly bullied, and yet is prevented by his sense of honour from telling a master about it.  I admit that honour is a fine idea; but it seems to me to cover a lot of things in human nature which are very bad indeed.  It may mean only a sort of prudential arrangement which binds a set of people together for a bad purpose, because they do not choose to be interfered with, and yet call the thing honour for the sake of the associations.”

“Yes, I don’t think it is necessarily a moral thing,” said Rose, “but that doesn’t seem to me to matter.  It is simply an obligation, pledged or implied, that you will act in a certain way.  It may conflict with a moral obligation, and then you have to decide which is the greater obligation.”

“Yes, that is perfectly true,” said Father Payne, “and as long as you admit that honour isn’t in itself bound to be a good thing, that is all I want.  Lestrange seemed to use it as if you had only got to say that a motive was honourable, to have it recognised by everyone as right.  Take the case of what are called ‘national obligations.’  A certain party in the State, having secured a majority of votes, enters into some arrangement—­a treaty, let us say—­without consulting the nation.  Is that held to be for ever binding on a nation till it is formally repealed?  Is it dishonourable for a citizen belonging, let us say, to the minority which is not represented by the particular Government which makes the treaty, to repudiate it?”