But the law is, of course, much stronger as to persons not citizens.  That is to say, no one has any right to immigrate into this country, and therefore intending immigrants may be kept out by legislation if they are anarchists, socialists, or, indeed, hold any opinion for the moment unpopular with Congress.  The attempt has so far, however, not been made to keep out any but violent anarchists, and, of course, persons who are diseased, of immoral life, or likely to become a public charge.  And the attempt to keep them under the hand of the central government for years after they have taken their place for good or ill in the State body politic has recently failed in a monumental case vindicating anew the Tenth Amendment.

Connected in most people’s mind with the right of privacy is the right of a person to keep his house and his private papers to himself; but it bears no relation whatever to the very new-fangled notion of a general right to privacy.  The two principles are that an Englishman’s house is his castle.  His home, even though it be but one room in a tenement, may not be invaded by anybody, even by any government official or authority (except, of course, under modern sanitary police regulation), without a written warrant specifying the reason for such invasion, some offence with which the man is charged, and some particular document or paper, or other evidence of which they are in search.  The principle against general warrants—­that is, warrants specifying no definite offence or naming no particular person—­was established in Massachusetts in Colony times, and the principle taken over to England and affirmed by Lord Camden—­one of the two or three celebrated examples where we have given a new constitutional principle back to the mother country.  Now, closely connected with this is another principle that a man shall not be compelled to testify in a criminal matter against himself, or that, if so compelled by statute or official, he shall then forever be immune from prosecution for any crime revealed by such testimony; the wording of the earlier constitutional provisions was “in a criminal offence,” but by modern, more liberal interpretation, it has been extended to any compulsory testimony, whether given in a criminal proceeding or not.  This, with the principle protecting a man’s private affairs from inquisition, is expressed in our Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the former prohibiting unreasonable searches and general warrants, and the latter providing that no one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor deprived of property without due process of law, and it has reasonably been argued that an inquisition into a person’s business or book of accounts is such deprivation of his property without due process of law, at least when applied to a natural person.  I find no legislation limiting these important principles, but on the contrary the tendency in modern statutes and modern State constitutions is to extend and generalize