The modern practice of putting everything into the State constitution which we have called attention to in other places, has led, of course, to a practical referendum on all most important matters, for no constitution, with the exception of that of Virginia, has ever been adopted in any of our States except by the people at an election; and with the tendency to require the submission of a new constitution every twenty years, and to make the constitution itself so compendious as to cover a vast amount of matter, usually subjects of legislation, with the consequent necessity of frequent amendment, we have now in our Southern States and some of the Western States a practical referendum to the people of most important legislative matters every few years.

The initiative and referendum was adopted in Iowa in 1891.  As to bonds and debts of cities, etc., in Ohio in 1902.  In Oregon, the general initiative and referendum by constitutional amendment in 1903.  As to franchises for public utilities only, in Wisconsin, Montana, and Arizona the same year.  As to Chicago, Illinois, in 1904, and in several States, what we will term the local or limited referendum, in the last four or five years.  It was, however, defeated in Massachusetts, although adopted in Maine; and in Delaware the whole question was submitted to a commission to investigate.

The recall, a still more recent device than the initiative and referendum, has, indeed, no precedent in the past, or in other countries.  In substance, it makes the tenure of office of an elective official dependent on the continuous good-will of the voters, or of a certain proportion of the voters.  Under the present charter of the city of Boston, the mayor may be “recalled” upon petition of fifty per cent. of the registered voters—­a proportion which practically makes the recall impossible.  Where, however, the initiative of the recall depends on a small proportion and the result is determined by a simple majority vote at the polls, it is easy to see that the mayor or other official would be in continuous apprehension, if he cared for his office, and in any event would not be able to adopt and follow out any continuous policy.  The terms of most of our officials are brief.  A proposal to apply the “recall” to judges would, in the opinion of the writer, be wicked, if not unconstitutional; as to all other officials, it would tend to destroy their efficiency, and in most cases be in itself ridiculous, at least as to short-term officers holding for only one or two years.

One of the most noteworthy of political changes that have occurred in the republic since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, is that affecting the election and tenure of office of judges.  Smith, in his book on American State Constitutions, published shortly after the Revolution, tells us that at that time every State in the Union had its judges appointed by the executive for a life term.  To-day, this principle