his advisers or servants. In England, to-day,
the real sovereign is the Parliament; the merest shadow
of sovereignty is left to the executive, the king,
and none whatever given the judicial branch. In
this country we preserve the three branches distinct,
though none, not all three together, are sovereign;
it is the people who are that. And each department
is of equal dignity; although at one period there was
a certain amount of public complaint that Congress
was usurping more power than belongs to it, and recently
that power was being usurped by the president, there
has hardly been (except from Mr. Gompers and Mr. Hearst)
any complaint that power is usurped by the judicial
branch, however unpopular its decisions. But
in England there is no pretence of maintaining the
three branches uniform either in importance or in
power. Starting with the Great Council, which
had originally only a certain amount of executive
power and a great deal of judicial power, they have
retained and added to the former, while practically
giving up the latter; and, moreover, they have divided
into the two houses, the House of Lords and the House
of Commons, with a division of sovereignty between
them, the Commons, of course, getting the lion’s
share. The only judicial power substantially now
remaining in the English Parliament is the power of
impeachment, which is rarely exercised in England,
and the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords,
of the “law” lords, that is, those peers
who held legal offices. On the other hand the
legislative function of Parliament, which began merely
in the way of saying what the law was, has enormously
developed, and still more so the executive. Thus
the legislative branch of the three divisions in the
English government has increased out of all proportion
to both the others, having now all the legislative
power and most of the executive. And legislatively
it is omnipotent; it is confined by no constitution;
even the king cannot withhold his consent. Parliament
can make any law, although against what was
the Constitution; the Constitution may be modified
by a simple statute. So their legislative function
is infinite; and their executive function has, in
substance, grown very large, because the British government
is carried on by the cabinet, which is practically
a committee of the House of Commons. But of the
judicial function, which was the principal function
of the Great Council at the time of the Conquest,
hardly a shred remains. It is the history of all
countries that people are not jealous of the judicial
power, while they are extremely anxious to seize the
legislative and executive. With us, however,
we are supposed to have all three functions co-ordinate
and in good working activity. But in both countries,
money bills, bills imposing taxes, are the function
of the lower house. That principle grew historically
from the principle that all taxation must be voted
by the people, directly or indirectly; must be with
the common consent and for the common benefit.
That principle was established by the House of Commons,
and consequently they arrogated to themselves that
part of the legislative power. That principle
we have retained in our Federal Constitution, and
in most of our State constitutions; all of which have
the double house.