persons to give testimony in litigation about trusts and exempting them from prosecution therefor.  North Dakota has also a statute prohibiting unfair competition and discrimination as against localities, while Tennessee makes it a misdemeanor to sell any article below cost or to give it away for the purpose of destroying competition.  In 1908 Louisiana and Mississippi adopted the principle forbidding discrimination against localities, and the new State of Oklahoma comes into line with the usual drastic anti-trust statute, and we may, perhaps, conclude this review of a somewhat unintelligent legislative history by perhaps the most amusing example of all.  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which had so far refrained from unnecessary legislation on this great question, thought it necessary to adopt a statute making void contracts to create monopolies in restraint of trade, which well shows the necessity of a legislative reference bureau or professional draftsman, as discussed in a later chapter.  That is to say, it says literally:  “Every contract, etc., in violation of the common law ... is hereby declared to be against public policy, illegal, and void.”  As the law of Massachusetts is the common law, and always has been the common law, this amounts to saying that a contract which has always been void in Massachusetts is now declared to be void.  But, moreover, on a familiar principle of hermeneutics, it might be argued to repeal the whole criminal common law of restraint of trade—­doubtless the last thing they intended to do!

As this is a book upon actual legislation, it would be out of place to attempt a serious discussion of the problem that lies before us.  Suffice it to say that there are three possible methods of approaching the question, as it is complicated with the interstate commerce power of the Federal government.  That is to say, either to surrender this power to the States, at least so far as it may be necessary to enable them to regulate or prohibit the actions of combinations in the States, even when engaged In interstate commerce; or, second, by perfecting the present dual system and establishing Federal supervision over State corporations engaged in interstate commerce by way of license and control; or, third, the most radical remedy of all, apparently adopted by the present administration, of surrendering entirely the State power over corporations to the Federal government, at least as to such corporations as might choose to take advantage of such legislation.  This would result in a centralization of nearly all business under the control of the Federal government, as well as the removal of the great bulk of litigation from State to Federal courts.  If not carefully guarded it would deprive the States not only of their power to tax corporations, but of their ordinary police powers over their administration.  Such a radical step was unanimously opposed by the United States Industrial Commission in 1900, and by nearly all their expert witnesses, and was then, at least, only favored by the heads of the great trusts, Mr. Archbold, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Havemeyer.[1] But whichever way we look at it, there is no question that the problem of the modern trust is that of the corporation, both as to what laws shall regulate such a corporation, and whether they shall be acts of Congress, or State statutes, or both.