At the first streak of dawn, Jackson aroused his men and resumed the march.  Before the column gained the plain, Stuart’s cavalry clattered past, leaving Patterson at Charlestown, in ignorance of his adversary’s escape, and congratulating himself on the success of his cautious strategy.  At Piedmont, a station at the foot of the Blue Ridge, trains were waiting for the conveyance of the troops; and at four o’clock in the afternoon Jackson and his brigade had reached Manassas Junction.  The cavalry, artillery, and waggons moved by road; and the remainder of Johnston’s infantry was expected to follow the First Brigade without delay.  But in war, unless there has been ample time for preparation, railways are not always an expeditious means of travel.  The line was single; so short notice had been given that it was impossible to collect enough rolling-stock; the officials were inexperienced; there was much mismanagement; and on the morning of Sunday, July 21, only three brigades of the Army of the Shenandoah—­Jackson’s, Bee’s, and Bartow’s—­together with the cavalry and artillery, had joined Beauregard.  Kirby Smith’s brigade, about 1900 strong, was still upon the railway.

The delay might easily have been disastrous.  Happily, the Federal movements were even more tardy.  Had the invading army been well organised, Beauregard would probably have been defeated before Johnston could have reached him.  McDowell had advanced from Washington on the afternoon of the 16th with 35,000 men.  On the morning of the 18th, the greater part of his force was concentrated at Centreville, twenty-two miles from Washington, and five and a half north-east of Manassas Junction.  Beauregard’s outposts had already fallen back to the banks of Bull Run, a stream made difficult by wooded and precipitous banks, from two to three miles south, and of much the same width as the Thames at Oxford.

It would have been possible to have attacked on the morning of the 19th, but the Federal commander was confronted by many obstacles.  He knew little of the country.  Although it was almost within sight of the capital, the maps were indifferent.  Guides who could describe roads and positions from a military point of view were not forthcoming.  All information had to be procured by personal reconnaissance, and few of his officers had been trained to such work.  Moreover, the army was most unwieldy. 35,000 men, together with ten batteries, and the requisite train of waggons, was a force far larger than any American officer had yet set eyes upon; and the movement of such a mass demanded precise arrangement on the part of the staff, and on the part of the troops most careful attention to order and punctuality; but of these both staff and troops were incapable.  The invading force might have done well in a defensive position, which it would have had time to occupy, and where the supply of food and forage, carried on from stationary magazines, would have been comparatively easy; but directly it