But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or threatening the Manassas Railway.  Johnston had thus a most delicate task before him; and in view of the superior numbers which the Federals could bring against Manassas, it was essential that not a man should he wasted in minor enterprises.  The defeat of Patterson, even had it been practicable, would not have prevented the Washington column from advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the Valley would be one the less at Manassas.

July 15.

On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the direction of Winchester.  On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker’s Hill, nine miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his advance, moved to his left and occupied Charlestown.  His indecision was manifest.  He, too, had no easy part to play.  His instructions were to hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against Beauregard.  But his instructions were either too definite or not definite enough, and he himself was overcautious.  He believed, and so did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by demonstrations—­that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned attacks.  For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack.  Even in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had an unenviable reputation.  They had enlisted for three months, and their term of service was nearly up.  Their commander had no influence with them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly refused to remain with the colours even for a few days over their term of service.  They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they had received from the Government.  The men had received no pay.  Many were without shoes, and others, according to their general, were “without pants!” “They cannot march,” he adds, “and, unless a paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and have just cause of complaint."* (* O.R. volume 2 pages 169, 170.)

Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous mistake when they allowed Patterson and his sans-culottes to move to Charlestown.  McDowell marched against Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and Patterson should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost.  Even had the latter been successful, he could hardly have reinforced the main army in time to meet McDowell.

July 18.

At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 18th Johnston received a telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell was advancing on Manassas.  Stuart was immediately directed to keep Patterson amused; and leaving their sick, 1700 in number, to the care of Winchester, the troops were ordered to strike tents and prepare to march.  No man knew the object of the movement, and when the regiments passed through Winchester,