Of Patterson’s further movements it is unnecessary to speak at length.  The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg.  Halting seven miles south-west Jackson was reinforced by Johnston’s whole command; and here, for four days, the Confederates, drawn up in line of battle, awaited attack.  But the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg; and on the fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester.  The Virginia soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied.  At first even Jackson chafed.  He was eager for further action.  His experiences at Falling Waters had given him no exalted notion of the enemy’s prowess, and he was ready to engage them single-handed.  “I want my brigade,” he said, “to feel that it can itself whip Patterson’s whole army, and I believe we can do it.”  But Johnston’s self-control was admirable.  He was ready to receive attack, believing that, in his selected position, he could repulse superior numbers.  But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an offensive movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the remonstrances of the officers.  The stone houses of Martinsburg and its walled inclosures were proof against assault, and promised at most a bloody victory.  His stock of ammunition was scanty in the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle south of Martinsburg.

The Federal army at Washington, commanded by General McDowell, amounted to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of the Potomac, and Beauregard’s 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas Junction, were seriously threatened.  In West Virginia the enemy had advanced, moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the southern end of the Valley, and not on Winchester.

July 11.

On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson’s birthplace; and although it was still in the heart of the Alleghanies, a few marches, which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the control of the Upper Valley.

Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over 80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more than 32,000 all told, looked small indeed.  But the three Federal columns were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the Manassas Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with greater rapidity than their opponents.

President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore determined to concentrate the whole available force at Manassas Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from Washington.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 515.) The difficulty was for the Army of the Shenandoah to give Patterson the slip.  This could easily have been done while that officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in Lee’s opinion, if the enemy found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concentrating at Manassas Junction, the Washington column would remain within its intrenchments round the capital, and the Confederates “would be put to the great disadvantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed.”  The concentration, therefore, was to be postponed until the Washington column advanced.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 507.)