on land, and on the sea had asserted an ascendency which it never lost.  The blue waters of the Gulf of Mexico were patrolled by a fleet with which the Confederates had no means of coping.  From the sea-wall of Charleston, the great Atlantic port of the South, the masts of the blockading squadron were visible in the offing; and beyond the mouths of the Mississippi, closing the approaches to New Orleans, the long black hulls steamed slowly to and fro.

But it was about Manassas Junction—­thirty miles south-west of Washington and barring the road to Richmond—­that all interest centred during the first campaign.  Here was posted the main army of the Confederacy, 20,000 volunteers under General Beauregard, the Manassas Gap Railway forming an easy means of communication with the Army of the Shenandoah.

Johnston’s force had been gradually increased to 10,000 officers and men.  But the general was by no means convinced of the desirability of holding Harper’s Ferry.  The place itself was insignificant.  It had contained an arsenal, but this had been burnt by the Federals when they evacuated the post; and it was absolutely untenable against attack.  To the east runs the Shenandoah; and immediately above the river stands a spur of the Blue Ridge, the Loudoun Heights, completely commanding the little town.  Beyond the Potomac is a crest of equal altitude, covered with forest trees and undergrowth, and bearing the name of the Maryland Heights.

Jackson, without waiting for instructions, had taken on himself to hold and fortify the Maryland Heights.  “I am of opinion,” he had written to General Lee, “that this place should be defended with the spirit which actuated the defenders of Thermopylae, and if left to myself such is my determination.  The fall of this place would, I fear, result in the loss of the north-western part of the State, and who can estimate the moral power thus gained to the enemy and lost to ourselves?"* (* O.R. volume 2 page 814.)

Lee, also, was averse to evacuation.  Such a measure, he said, would be depressing to the cause of the South, and would leave Maryland isolated.  The post, it was true, could be easily turned.  By crossing the Potomac, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, twenty and ten miles north-west respectively, the Federals would threaten the communications of the garrison with Winchester; in case they were attacked, the Confederates would have to fight with their backs to the Shenandoah, broad, deep, and unbridged; and the ground westward of Harper’s Ferry was ill adapted for defence.  Attack, in Lee’s opinion, would have been best met by a resolute offensive.* (* Ibid pages 881, 889, 897, 898, 901, 923.) Johnston, however, believed his troops unfitted for active manoeuvres, and he was permitted to choose his own course.  The incident is of small importance, but it serves to show an identity of opinion between Lee and Jackson, and a regard for the moral aspect of the situation which was to make itself manifest, with extraordinary results, at a later period.