Thus tested Jackson has few superiors.  During the whole of the two years he held command he never committed a single error.  At Mechanicsville, and again at Frayser’s Farm, the failure to establish some method of intercommunication left his column isolated; this, however, was a failure in staff duties, for which the Confederate headquarters was more to blame than himself.  And further, how sure and swift was the retribution which followed a mistake committed within his sphere of action!  What opportunity did Jackson miss?  His penetration was unerring; and when, after he had marked his prey, did he ever hesitate to swoop?  “What seemed reckless audacity,” it has been well said by one of the greatest of Southern soldiers, “was the essence of prudence.  His eye had caught at a glance the entire situation, and his genius, with marvellous celerity and accuracy, had weighed all the chances of success or failure.  While, therefore, others were slowly feeling their way, or employing in detail insufficient forces, Jackson, without for one moment doubting his success, hurled his army like a thunderbolt against the opposing lines, and thus ended the battle at a single blow."* (* General J.B.  Gordon, Commanding 2nd Army Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.  “Jackson,” says one of his staff, “never changed an order on the battlefield when he had once given it.  I have seen Ewell, Early, A.P.  Hill, and even Lee send an aide with an order, and in a few minutes send another messenger to recall or alter it.”  Letter to the author.)

But if Jackson never failed to take advantage of his opponent’s blunders, it might be said that he sometimes laid himself open to defeat.  Grant and Sheridan, had they been in place of Shields and Fremont, would hardly have suffered him to escape from Harper’s Ferry; Sherman would probably have crushed him at the Second Manassas; Thomas would not have been surprised at Chancellorsville.  But Jackson only pushed daring to its limits when it was safe to do so.  He knew the men he had to deal with.  And in whatever situation he might find himself he invariably reserved more than one means of escape.

On the field of battle his manoeuvres were always sound and often brilliant.  He never failed to detect the key-point of a position, or to make the best use of the ground.  On the defensive his flanks were always strong and his troops concealed both from view and fire; on the offensive he invariably attacked where he was least expected.  He handled the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the closest combination and with the maximum of effect.  Except at Kernstown, where Garnett interfered, his reserve was invariably put in at exactly the right moment, and he so manipulated his command that he was always strongest at the decisive point.  Nor did he forget that a battle is only half won where there is no pursuit, and whenever he held command upon the field, his troops, especially the cavalry, were so disposed that from