From Richmond the remains were conveyed to Lexington, and, under the charge of the cadets, lay for the night in the lecture-room of the Institute, which Jackson had quitted just two years before.  The next morning he was buried, as he himself had wished, in the little cemetery above the town.

Many were the mourners that stood around the grave, but they were few in number compared with those whose hearts were present on those silent hills.  From the cities of the Atlantic coast to the far-off settlements of Texas the news that Stonewall Jackson had fallen came as a stunning blow.  The people sorrowed for him with no ordinary grief, not as a great man and a good, who had done his duty and had gone to his reward, but as the pillar of their hopes and the sheet-anchor of the Confederate cause.  Nor will those familiar with the further history of the Civil War, from the disaster of Gettysburg to the surrender at Appomattox, question the truth of this mournful presage.  The Army of Northern Virginia became a different and less manageable instrument after Chancellorsville.  Over and over again it failed to respond to the conceptions of its leader, and the failure was not due to the soldiers, but to the generals.  Loyal and valiant as they were, of not one of his lieutenants could Lee say, as he had said of Jackson, “Such an executive officer the sun never shone on.  I have but to show him my design, and I know that if it can be done it will be done.  No need for me to send or watch him.  Straight as the needle to the pole he advances to the execution of my purpose."* (* Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 16, 1863.)

These words have been quoted as an epitome of Jackson’s military character.  “He was essentially,” says Swinton, “an executive officer, and in that sphere he was incomparable; but he was devoid of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning a combination, and of that calm, broad, military intelligence which distinguished General Lee."* (* Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac page 289.) And this verdict, except in the South, has been generally accepted.  Yet it rests on a most unsubstantial basis.  Because Jackson knew so well how to obey it is asserted that he was not well fitted for independent command.  Because he could carry out orders to the letter it is assumed that he was no master of strategy.  Because his will was of iron, and his purpose, once fixed, never for a moment wavered, we are asked to believe that his mental scope was narrow.  Because he was silent in council, not eager in expressing his ideas, and averse to argument, it is implied that his opinions on matters of great moment were not worth the hearing.  Because he was shy and unassuming; because he betrayed neither in face nor bearing, save in the heat of battle, any unusual power or consciousness of power, it is hastily concluded that he was deficient in the initiative, the breadth, and the penetration which are the distinguishing characteristics of great generals.