Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which had been hardly engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming up.  Of these, 25,000 men might possibly, could they have been manoeuvred in the forest, have been sent to drive Jackson back.  And, undoubtedly, to those who think more of numbers than of human nature, of the momentum of the mass rather than the mental equilibrium of the general, the fact that a superior force of comparatively fresh troops was at Hooker’s disposal will be sufficient to put the success of the Confederates out of court.  Yet the question will always suggest itself, would not the report that a victorious enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the darkness of the night, towards the only line of retreat, have so demoralised the Federal commander and the Federal soldiers, already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, that they would have thought only of securing their own safety?  Would Hooker, whose tactics the next day, after he had had the night given him in which to recover his senses, were so inadequate, have done better if he had received no respite?  Would the soldiers of the three army corps not yet engaged, who had been witnesses of the rout of Howard’s divisions, have fared better, when they heard the triumphant yells of the advancing Confederates, than the hapless Germans?  “The wounding of Jackson,” says a most careful historian of the battle, himself a participator in the Union disaster, “was a most fortunate circumstance for the Army of the Potomac.  At nine o’clock the capture or destruction of a large part of the army seemed inevitable.  There was, at the time, great uncertainty and a feeling akin to panic prevailing among the Union forces round Chancellorsville; and when we consider the position of the troops at this moment, and how many important battles have been won by trivial flank attacks—­how Richepanse (attacking through the forest) with a single brigade ruined the Austrians at Hohenlinden—­we must admit that the Northern army was in great peril when Jackson arrived within one thousand yards of its vital point (the White House) with 20,000 men and 50 cannon."* (* Chancellorsville, Lt.-Colonel A.C.  Hamlin.) He must be a great leader indeed who, when his flank is suddenly rolled up and his line of retreat threatened, preserves sufficient coolness to devise a general counterstroke.  Jackson had proved himself equal to such a situation at Cedar Run, but it is seldom in these circumstances that Providence sides with the “big battalions.”

The Federal losses in the six days’ battles were heavy:  over 12,000 at Chancellorsville, and 4700 at Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford; a total of 17,287.  The army lost 13 guns, and nearly 6000 officers and men were reported either captured or missing.

The casualties were distributed as follows:—­

First Army Corps. 185
Second ,, 1,925
Third, ,, 4,119
Fifth ,, 700
Sixth ,, 4,590
Eleventh ,, 2,412
Twelfth ,, 2,822
Pleasonton’s Cavalry Brigade 141
                               ------
                               16,844