He thus found himself in the dilemma which a general on the defensive, if he be weak in cavalry, has almost invariably to face, especially in a close country.  He was ignorant, and must necessarily remain ignorant, of where the main attack would be made.  Lee, on the other hand, by means of his superior cavalry, could reconnoitre the position at his leisure, and if he discovered a weak point could suddenly throw the greater portion of his force against it.  Hooker could only hope that no weak point existed.  Remembering that the Confederates were on the pike and the plank road, there certainly appeared no cause for apprehension.  The Fifth Corps, with its flank on the Rappahannock, held the left, covering the river and the old Mine roads.  Next in succession came the Second Corps, blocking the pike.  In the centre the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum, covered Chancellorsville.  The Third Corps, under Sickles, held Hazel Grove, with Berry’s division as general reserve; and on the extreme right, his breastworks running along the plank road as far as Talley’s Clearing, was Howard with the Eleventh Corps, composed principally of German regiments.  Strong outposts of infantry had been thrown out into the woods; the men were still working in the intrenchments; batteries were disposed so as to sweep every approach from the south, the south-east, or the south-west, and there were at least five men to every yard of parapet.  The line, however, six miles from flank to flank, was somewhat extensive, and to make certain, so far as possible, that sufficient numbers should be forthcoming to defend the position, at 1.55 on the morning of May 2, Sedgwick was instructed to send the First Army Corps to Chancellorsville.  Before midnight, moreover, thirty-four guns, principally horse.  Artillery, together with a brigade of infantry, were sent from Falmouth to Banks’ Ford.

Sedgwick, meantime, below Fredericksburg, had contented himself with engaging the outposts on the opposite ridge.  An order to make a brisk demonstration, which Hooker had dispatched at 11.30 A.M., did not arrive, the telegraph having broken down, until 5.45 P.M., six hours later; and it was then too late to effect any diversion in favour of the main army.

Yet it can hardly be said that Sedgwick had risen to the height of his responsibilities.  He knew that a portion at least of the Confederates had marched against Hooker, and the balloonists had early reported that a battle was in progress near Tabernacle Church.  But instead of obeying Napoleon’s maxim and marching to the sound of the cannon, he had made no effort to send support to his commander.  Both he and General Reynolds* (* The following letter (O.R. volume 25 page 337) is interesting as showing the state of mind into which the commanders of detached forces are liable to be thrown by the absence of information:—­

Headquarters, First Corps, May 1, 1863.

Major-General Sedgwick,