pages 215, 216.) Heavy reinforcements were in rear.  The two divisions of the Second Corps had marched from Banks’ Ford to United States Ford, six miles from Chancellorsville; while the Third Corps, ordered up from the Stafford Heights, was rapidly approaching the same point of passage.  Thus, 70,000 men, in the highest spirits at the success of their manoeuvres, were massed in rear of Lee’s lines, and Hooker saw victory within his grasp.

“It is with heartfelt satisfaction,” ran his general order, “that the commanding general announces to his army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.  The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.”

Hooker was skinning the lion while the beast yet lived, but he had certainly much reason for congratulation.  His manoeuvres had been skilfully planned and energetically executed.  The two rivers which protected the Confederate position had been crossed without loss; the Second and Third Corps had been brought into close touch with the right wing; Lee’s earthworks were completely turned, and Stoneman’s cavalry divisions, driving the enemy’s patrols before them, were already within reach of Orange Court House, and not more than twenty miles from Gordonsville.  Best of all, the interval between the two wings—­twenty-six miles on the night of the 28th—­was now reduced to eleven miles by the plank road.

Two things only were unsatisfactory:—­

1.  The absence of information.

2.  The fact that the whole movement had been observed by the Confederate cavalry.

Pleasonton’s brigade of horse had proved too weak for the duty assigned to it.  It had been able to protect the front, but it was too small to cover the flanks; and at the flanks Stuart had persistently struck.  Hooker appears to have believed that Stoneman’s advance against the Central Railroad would draw off the whole of the Confederate horse.  Stuart, however, was not to be beguiled from his proper functions.  Never were his squadrons more skilfully handled than in this campaign.  With fine tactical insight, as soon as the great movement on Chancellorsville became pronounced, he had attacked the right flank of the Federal columns with Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, leaving only the two regiments under W.H.F.  Lee to watch Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres.  Then, having obtained the information he required, he moved across the Federal front, and routing one of Pleasonton’s regiments in a night affair near Spotsylvania Court House, he had regained touch with his own army.  The results of his manoeuvres were of the utmost importance.  Lee was fully informed as to his adversary’s strength; the Confederate cavalry was in superior strength at the critical point, that is, along the front of the two armies; and Hooker had no knowledge whatever of what was going on in the space between Sedgwick and himself.  He was only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confederate position before Fredericksburg was still strongly occupied.