April 30.

The next message, which does not appear to have been received until the morning of the 30th, threw more light on the situation.  Stuart had made prisoners from the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth Corps, and had ascertained that the corps commanders, Meade, Howard, and Slocum, were present with the troops.  Anderson, moreover, who had been instructed to select and intrench a strong position, was falling back from Chancellorsville before the enemy’s advance, and two things became clear:—­

1.  That it was Hooker’s intention to turn the Confederate left.

2.  That he had divided his forces.

The question now to be decided was which wing should be attacked first.  There was much to be said in favour of crushing Sedgwick.  His numbers were estimated at 35,000 men, and the Confederates had over 60,000.  Moreover, time is a most important consideration in the use of interior lines.  The army was already concentrated in front of Sedgwick, whereas it would require a day’s march to seek Hooker in the forest round Chancellorsville.  Sedgwick’s, too, was the smaller of the Federal wings, and his overthrow would certainly ruin Hooker’s combinations.  “Jackson at first,” said Lee, “preferred to attack Sedgwick’s force in the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him I feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg.  It was hard to get at the enemy, and harder to get away if we drove him into the river, but if he thought it could be done, I would give orders for it.”  Jackson asked to be allowed to examine the ground, but soon came to the conclusion that the project was too hazardous and that Lee was right.  Orders were then issued for a concentration against Hooker, 10,000 men, under General Early, remaining to confront Sedgwick on the heights of Fredericksburg.

We may now turn to the movements of the Federals.

Hooker’s right wing had marched at a speed which had been hitherto unknown in the Army of the Potomac.  At nightfall, on April 30, the three army corps, although they had been delayed by the Confederate cavalry, were assembled at Chancellorsville.  In three days they had marched forty-six miles over bad roads, had forded breast-high two difficult rivers, established several bridges, and captured over a hundred prisoners.* (* The troops carried eight days’ supplies:  three days’ cooked rations with bread and groceries in the haversacks; five days’ bread and groceries in the knapsacks; five days’ “beef on the hoof.”  The total weight carried by each man, including sixty rounds of ammunition, was 45 pounds.  The reserve ammunition was carried principally by pack mules, and only a small number of waggons crossed the Rappahannock.  Four pontoon bridges were laid by the engineers.  One bridge took three-quarters of an hour to lay; the other three, one and a half hour to lay, and an hour to take up.  Each bridge was from 100 to 140 yards long.  O.R. volume 25