Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,209 pages of information about Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,209 pages of information about Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.
would move up the Rappahannock to Kelly’s Ford, push forward to the Rapidan, cross at Ely’s and Germanna fords, and march upon Chancellorsville.  The Third Corps was to remain concentrated on the Stafford Heights, ready to reinforce either wing as circumstances might require.  The Second Corps was to leave one division on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two divisions on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks’ Ford.

It will be observed that this design would place a wide interval between the two wings of the Federal army, thus giving the Confederates, although much inferior in numbers, the advantage of the interior lines.* (* From Franklin’s Crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick’s bridges were thrown, to Kelly’s Ford is 27 miles; to Ely’s Ford 19 miles, and to Chancellorsville 11 miles.) Hooker, however, who knew the Confederate strength to a man, was confident that Lee, directly he found his position turned, and Stoneman in his rear, would at once retreat on Richmond.  Yet he was not blind to the possibility that his great adversary, always daring, might assume the offensive, and attempt to crush the Federal wings in detail.  Still the danger appeared small.  Either wing was practically equal to the whole Confederate force.  Sedgwick had 40,000, with the Third Corps, 19,000, and a division of the Second, 5,500, close at hand; Hooker 42,000, with two divisions of the Second Corps, 11,000, at Banks’ Ford; the Third Corps could reinforce him in less than four-and-twenty hours; and Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres, riding at will amongst Lee’s supply depots, would surely prevent him from attacking.  Still precaution was taken in case the attempt were made.  Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of his force towards Chancellorsville, was “to carry the works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph road."* (* O.R. volume 25 page 268.) The right wing, “if not strongly resisted, was to advance at all hazards, and secure a position uncovering Banks’ Ford."* (* O.R. volume 25 page 274.) Were the Confederates found in force near Chancellorsville, it was to select a strong position and await attack on its own ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, would assail the enemy in flank and rear.

Such was the plan which, if resolutely carried out, bade fair to crush Lee’s army between the upper and the nether millstones, and it seems that the size and condition of his forces led Hooker to anticipate an easy victory.  If the Army of the Potomac was not “the finest on the planet,” as in an order of the day he boastfully proclaimed it, it possessed many elements of strength.  Hooker was a strict disciplinarian with a talent for organisation.  He had not only done much to improve the efficiency of his troops, but his vigorous measures had gone far to restore their confidence.  When he succeeded Burnside a large proportion of the soldiers had lost heart and hope.  The generals who had hitherto

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Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.