From that moment the Commander-in-Chief abandoned all hope that his missing divisions would be with him when Hooker moved.  Bitterly indeed was he to suffer for his selection of a commander for his detached force.  The loss of 3000 men at Suffolk, had the works been stormed, and Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock, would have been more than repaid.  The addition of 12,000 fine soldiers, flushed with success, and led by two of the most brilliant fighting generals in the Confederate armies, would have made the victory of Chancellorsville a decisive triumph.  Better still had Longstreet adhered to his original orders.  But both he and Mr. Seddon forgot, as Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand principle of concentration at the decisive point.

Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, was also oblivious of the first axiom of war.  As soon as the weather improved he determined to move against Richmond.  His task, however, was no simple one.  On the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks’ Ford to Port Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon line of fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a numerous artillery, against which it was difficult to find position for the Federal guns, and occupied by the victors of Fredericksburg.  A frontal attack gave even less promise of success than in Burnside’s disastrous battle.  But behind Lee’s earthworks were his lines of supply; the Richmond Railway, running due south, with the road to Bowling Green alongside; and second, the plank road, which, running at first due west, led past Chancellorsville, a large brick mansion, standing in a dense forest, to Orange Court House and the depots on the Virginia Central Railroad.

At these roads and railways Hooker determined to strike, expecting that Lee would at once fall back, and give the Army of the Potomac the opportunity of delivering a heavy blow.* (* Hooker to Lincoln, April 12, O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 199.) To effect his object he divided his 130,000 men into three distinct bodies.  The cavalry, which, with the exception of one small brigade, had moved under General Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by way of Rappahannock Station, and either capturing or passing Culpeper and Gordonsville, to cut the Confederate communications, and should Lee retreat, to hold him fast.* (* The cavalry was to take supplies for six days, food and forage, depending on the country and on captures for any further quantity that might be required.) General Sedgwick, with two army corps, the First and Sixth, forming the left wing of the army, was to cross the river below Fredericksburg, make a brisk demonstration of attack, and if the enemy fell back follow him rapidly down the Bowling Green and Telegraph roads.  Then, while Lee’s attention was thus attracted, the right wing, composed of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with Pleasonton’s brigade of cavalry, under Hooker’s own command,