Had Jackson been in Longstreet’s place, the Secretary’s proposal, however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been rejected.  The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief.  Longstreet, however, brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived the duties of a detached force.  He was already prejudiced in favour of a movement against Suffolk.  Before he left for his new command, he had suggested to Lee that one army corps only should remain on the Rappahannock, while the other operated south of Richmond; and soon after his arrival he urged upon his superior that, in case Hooker moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the North Anna.  In short, to his mind the operations of the main body should be made subservient to those of the detached force; Lee, with 30,000 men, holding Hooker’s 130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his victory and could march north to join him.  Such strategy was not likely to find favour at headquarters.  It was abundantly evident, in the first place, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be the principal objective of the Federals; and, in the second place, that the defeat of the force of Suffolk, if it were practicable, would have no effect whatever upon Hooker’s action, except insomuch that his knowledge of Longstreet’s absence might quicken his resolution to advance.  Had Suffolk been a point vital to the North the question would have assumed a different shape.  As it was, the town merely covered a tract of conquered territory, the Norfolk dockyard, and the mouth of the James River.  The Confederates would gain little by its capture; the Federals would hardly feel its loss.  It was most improbable that a single man of Hooker’s army would be detached to defend a point of such comparative insignificance, and it was quite possible that Longstreet would be unable to get back in time to meet him, even on the North Anna.  General Lee, however, anxious as ever to defer to the opinions of the man on the spot, as well as to meet the wishes of the Government, yielded to Longstreet’s insistence that a fine opportunity for an effective blow presented itself, and in the first week of April the latter marched against Suffolk.

April 17.

His movement was swift and sudden.  But, as Lee had anticipated, the Federal position was strongly fortified, with the flanks secure, and Longstreet had no mind to bring matters to a speedy conclusion.  “He could reduce the place,” he wrote on April 17, “in two or three days, but the expenditure of ammunition would be very large; or he could take it by assault, but at a cost of 3000 men.”

The Secretary of War agreed with him that the sacrifice would be too great, and so, at a time when Hooker was becoming active on the Rappahannock, Lee’s lieutenant was quietly investing Suffolk, one hundred and twenty miles away.