orders and dispatches in the Official Records, their existence was never recognised.  To this oversight the successive defeats of the Northern forces were in great part due.  From McClellan to Banks, each one of their generals appears to have been blind to the advantages that may be derived from a study of the theatre of war.  Not one of them hit upon a line of operations which embarrassed the Confederates, and all possessed the unhappy knack of joining battle on the most unfavourable terms.  Moreover, when it at last became clear that the surest means of conquering a country is to defeat its armies, the true objective was but vaguely realised.  The annihilation of the enemy’s troops seems to have been the last thing dreamt of.  Opportunities of crushing him in detail were neither sought for nor created.  As General Sheridan said afterwards:  “The trouble with the commanders of the Army of the Potomac was that they never marched out to “lick” anybody; all they thought of was to escape being “licked” themselves.”

But it is not sufficient, in planning strategical combinations, to arrive at a correct conclusion as regards the objective.  Success demands a most careful calculation of ways and means:  of the numbers at disposal; of food, forage, and ammunition; and of the forces to he detached for secondary purposes.  The different factors of the problem—­the strength and dispositions of the enemy, the roads, railways, fortresses, weather, natural features, the morale of the opposing armies, the character of the opposing general, the facilities for supply have each and all of them to be considered, their relative prominence assigned to them, and their conflicting claims to be brought into adjustment.

For such mental exertion Jackson was well equipped.  He had made his own the experience of others.  His knowledge of history made him familiar with the principles which had guided Washington and Napoleon in the selection of objectives, and with the means by which they attained them.  It is not always easy to determine the benefit, beyond a theoretical acquaintance with the phenomena of the battle-field, to be derived from studying the campaigns of the great masters of war.  It is true that no successful general, whatever may have been his practical knowledge, has neglected such study; but while many have borne witness to its efficacy, none have left a record of the manner in which their knowledge of former campaigns influenced their own conduct.

In the case of Stonewall Jackson, however, we have much evidence, indirect, but unimpeachable, as to the value to a commander of the knowledge thus acquired.  The Maxims of Napoleon, carried in his haversack, were constantly consulted throughout his campaigns, and this little volume contains a fairly complete exposition, in Napoleon’s own words, of the grand principles of war.  Moreover, Jackson often quoted principles which are not to be found in the Maxims, but on which Napoleon consistently acted.