This entails a consideration of the strategic points upon the theatre of war, for it is by occupying or threatening some point which the enemy cannot afford to lose that he will be induced to disperse his army, or to place himself in a position where he can be attacked at a disadvantage.  While his main army, therefore, is the ultimate objective, certain strategic points become the initial objectives, to be occupied or threatened either by the main body or detached forces.  It is seldom, however, that these initial objectives are readily discovered; and it is very often the case that even the ultimate objective may be obscured.

These principles are well illustrated by the operations in the Valley of Virginia during the month of May and the first fortnight of June, 1862.  After the event it is easy to see that Banks’ army was Jackson’s proper objective—­being the principal force in the secondary theatre of war.  But at the time, before the event, Lee and Jackson alone realised the importance of overwhelming Banks and thus threatening Washington.  It was not realised by Johnston, a most able soldier, for the whole of his correspondence goes to show that he thought a purely defensive attitude the best policy for the Valley Army.  It was not realised by Jackson’s subordinates, for it was not till long after the battle of Winchester that the real purport of the operations in which they had been engaged began to dawn on them.  It was not realised by Lincoln, by Stanton, or even by McClellan, for to each of them the sudden attack on Front Royal was as much of a surprise as to Banks himself; and we may be perfectly confident that none but a trained strategist, after a prolonged study of the map and the situation, would realise it now.

It is to be noted, too, that Jackson’s initial objectives—­the strategical points in the Valley—­were invariably well selected.  The Luray Gap, the single road which gives access across the Massanuttons from one side of the Valley to the other, was the most important.  The flank position on Elk Run, the occupation of which so suddenly brought up Banks, prevented him interposing between Jackson and Edward Johnson, and saved Staunton from capture, was a second; Front Royal, by seizing which he threatened Banks at Strasburg in flank and rear, compelling him to a hasty retreat, and bringing him to battle on ground which he had not prepared, a third; and the position at Port Republic, controlling the only bridge across the Shenandoah, and separating Shields from Fremont, a fourth.  The bearing of all these localities was overlooked by the Federals, and throughout the campaign we cannot fail to notice a great confusion on their part as regards objectives.  They neither recognised what the aim of their enemy would be, nor at what they should aim themselves.  It was long before they discovered that Lee’s army, and not Richmond, was the vital point of the Confederacy.  Not a single attempt was made to seize strategic points, and if we may judge from the