It will not be pretended that the discipline of regular troops always rises superior to privation and defeat.  It is a notorious fact that the number of deserters from Wellington’s army in Spain and Portugal, men who wilfully absented themselves from the colours and wandered over the country, was by no means inconsiderable; while the behaviour of the French regulars in 1870, and even of the Germans, when they rushed back in panic through the village of Gravelotte, deaf to the threats and entreaties of their aged sovereign, was hardly in accordance with military tradition.  Nevertheless, it is not difficult to show that the Southerners fell somewhat short of the highest standard.  They were certainly not incapable of keeping their ranks under a hot fire, or of holding their ground to the last extremity.  Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg is one of the most splendid examples of disciplined valour in the annals of war, and the endurance of Lee’s army at Sharpsburg has seldom been surpassed.  Nor was the disorder into which the attacking lines were sooner or later thrown a proof of inferior training.  Even in the days of flint-lock muskets, the admixture of not only companies and battalions, but even of brigades and divisions, was a constant feature of fierce assaults over broken ground.  If, under such conditions, the troops still press forward, and if, when success has been achieved, order is rapidly restored, then discipline is good; and in neither respect did the Confederates fail.  But to be proof against disorder is not everything in battle.  It is not sufficient that the men should be capable of fighting fiercely; to reap the full benefit of their weapons and their training they must be obedient to command.  The rifle is a far less formidable weapon when every man uses it at his own discretion than when the fire of a large body of troops is directed by a single will.  Precision of movement, too, is necessary for the quick concentration of superior forces at the decisive point, for rapid support, and for effective combination.  But neither was the fire of the Confederate infantry under the complete control of their officers, nor were their movements always characterised by order and regularity.  It was seldom that the men could be induced to refrain from answering shot with shot; there was an extraordinary waste of ammunition, there was much unnecessary noise, and the regiments were very apt to get out of hand.  It is needless to bring forward specific proof; the admissions of superior officers are quite sufficient.  General D.H.  Hill, in an interesting description of the Southern soldier, speaks very frankly of his shortcomings.  “Self-reliant always, obedient when he chose to be, impatient of drill and discipline.  He was unsurpassed as a scout or on the skirmish line.  Of the shoulder-to-shoulder courage, bred of drill and discipline, he knew nothing and cared less.  Hence, on the battle-field, he was more of a free lance than a machine.  Who ever saw a Confederate