and these masses were never used.  They had not yet learned, as had Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, that superior numbers are of no avail unless they are brought into action, impelling the attack forward by sheer weight, at the decisive point.  In the second place, none of the Federal leaders possessed the entire confidence either of their generals or their troops.  With all its affection for McClellan, it may strongly be questioned whether his army gave him credit for dash or resolution.  Pope was defeated in his first action at Cedar Run.  Banks at Winchester, Fremont west of Staunton, had both been out-manoeuvred.  Burnside had against him his feeble conduct at Sharpsburg.  Hence the Federal soldiers fought most of their offensive battles under a terrible disadvantage.  They were led by men who had known defeat, and who owed their defeat, in great measure, to the same fault—­neglect to employ their whole force in combination.  Brave and unyielding as they were, the troops went into battle mistrustful of their leader’s skill, and fearful, from the very outset, that their efforts would be unsupported; and when men begin to look over their shoulders for reinforcements, demoralisation is not far off.  It would be untrue to say that a defeated general can never regain the confidence of his soldiers; but unless he has previous successes to set off against his failure, to permit him to retain his position is dangerous in the extreme.  Such was the opinion of Jackson, always solicitous of the morale of his command.  “To his mind nothing ever fully excused failure, and it was rarely that he gave an officer the opportunity of failing twice.  ‘The service,’ he said, ‘cannot afford to keep a man who does not succeed.’  Nor was he ever restrained from a change by the fear of making matters worse.  His motto was, get rid of the unsuccessful man at once, and trust to Providence for finding a better.”

Nor was the presence of discredited generals the only evil which went to neutralise the valour of the Federal soldiers.  The system of command was as rotten in the Army of the Potomac as in the Armies of Northern Virginia and of the Valley it was sound; and the system of command plays a most important part in war.  The natural initiative of the American, the general fearlessness of responsibility, were as conspicuous among the soldiers as in the nation at large.  To those familiar with the Official Records, where the doings of regiments and even companies are preserved, it is perfectly apparent that, so soon as the officers gained experience, the smaller units were as boldly and efficiently handled as in the army of Germany under Moltke.  But while Lee and Jackson, by every means in their power, fostered the capacity for independent action, following therein the example of Napoleon,* (* In the opinion of the author, the charge of centralisation preferred against Napoleon can only be applied to his leading in his later campaigns.  In his earlier operations he gave his generals every latitude, and