No attempt was made by the Confederates to follow the enemy across the Rappahannock.  The upper fords were open; but the river was rising fast, and the Army of the Potomac, closely concentrated and within a few miles of Aquia Creek, was too large to be attacked, and too close to its base to permit effective manoeuvres, which might induce it to divide, against its line of communications.  The exultation of the Southern soldiers in their easy victory was dashed by disappointment.  Burnside’s escape had demonstrated the fallacy of one of the so-called rules of war.  The great river which lay behind him during the battle of Fredericksburg had proved his salvation instead of—­as it theoretically should—­his ruin.  Over the six bridges his troops had more lines of retreat than is usually the case when roads only are available; and these lines of retreat were secure, protected from the Confederate cavalry by the river, and from the infantry and artillery by the batteries on the Stafford Heights.  Had the battle been fought on the North Anna, thirty-six miles from Fredericksburg, the result might have been very different.  A direct counterstroke would possibly have been no more practicable than on the Rappahannock, for the superior numbers of the enemy, and his powerful artillery, could not have been disregarded.  Nor would a direct pursuit have been a certain means of making success decisive; the rear of a retreating army, as the Confederates had found to their cost at Malvern Hill, is usually its strongest part.  But a pursuit directed against the flanks, striking the line of retreat, cutting off the supply and ammunition trains, and blocking the roads, a pursuit such as Jackson had organised when he drove Banks from the Valley, if conducted with vigour, seldom fails in its effect.  And who would have conducted such an operation with greater skill and energy than Stuart, at the head of his 9000 horsemen?  Who would have supported Stuart more expeditiously than the “foot-cavalry” of the Second Army Corps?

Lee’s position at Fredericksburg, strong as it might appear, was exceedingly disadvantageous.  A position which an army occupies with a view to decisive battle should fulfil four requirements:—­

1.  It should not be too strong, or the enemy will not attack it.

2.  It should give cover to the troops both from view and fire from artillery, and have a good field of fire.

3.  It should afford facilities for counterstroke.

4.  It should afford facilities for pursuit.

Of these Lee’s battle-field fulfilled but the first and second.  It would have been an admirable selection if the sole object of the Confederates had been to gain time, or to prevent the enemy establishing himself south of the Rappahannock; but to encompass the destruction of the enemy’s whole army it was as ill adapted as Wellington’s position at Torres Vedras, at Busaco, or at Fuentes d’Onor.  But while Wellington in taking up these positions had