Under cover of the night this retrograde movement was effected without loss; and the cavalry, as they marched back, saw the camp-fires kindling on the skirts of the forest, and the infantry digging intrenchments by the fitful glare.

The Second Corps had not come into action.  Jackson had issued orders that every gun, of whatever calibre or range, which was not disabled should be brought to the front and open fire at sunset; and that as soon as the enemy showed signs of wavering, the infantry should charge with fixed bayonets, and sweep the invaders into the river.  Hood’s division, which had been temporarily placed at his disposal, was instructed to co-operate.* (* Advance and Retreat, Lieutenant-General J.B.  Hood page 50.) It appears, however, that it had not been easy, in the short space of daylight still available, to remedy the confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by Meade’s attack and their own counterstroke.  The divisions were to some extent mixed up.  Several regiments had been broken, and the ammunition of both infantry and artillery needed replenishment.  Moreover, it was difficult in the extreme to bring the batteries forward through the forest; and, when they eventually arrived, the strength of the Federal position was at once revealed.  Franklin’s line was defended by a hundred and sixteen field pieces, generally of superior metal to those of the Confederates, and the guns on the Stafford Heights, of which at least thirty bore upon Jackson’s front, were still in action.  As the first Confederate battery advanced, this great array of artillery, which had been for some time comparatively quiet, reopened with vigour, and, to use Jackson’s words, “so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned.”

But he was not yet at the end of his resources.  A strong position, which cannot be turned, is not always impregnable.  If the ground be favourable, and few obstacles exist, a night attack with the bayonet, especially if the enemy be exhausted or half-beaten, has many chances of success; and during the evening Jackson made arrangements for such a movement.  “He asked me,” says Dr. McGuire, “how many yards of bandaging I had, and when I replied that I did not know the exact number, but that I had enough for another fight, he seemed a little worried at my lack of information and showed his annoyance.  I repeated rather shortly, “I have enough for another battle,” meaning to imply that this was all that it was necessary for him to know.  I then asked him:  “Why do you want to know how much bandaging I have?” He said:  “I want a yard of bandaging to put on the arm of every soldier in this night’s attack, so that the men may know each other from the enemy.”  I told him I had not enough cotton cloth for any such purpose, and that he would have to take a piece of the shirt tail of each soldier to supply the cloth, but, unfortunately, half of them had no shirts!  The expedient was never tried.  General Lee decided that the attack would be too hazardous."* (* Letter to the author.)