Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by reason of the woods, and with such ease had the Federal attacks been repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the extent of his success.  Ignorant, too, as he necessarily was, of the mistrust and want of confidence in its leaders with which the Federal army was infected, he was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had in the hearts of his enemies; while, on the other hand, the inaccessible batteries on the Stafford Heights were an outward and visible token of unabated strength.

Jackson, however, although the short winter day was already closing in, considered that the attempt was worth making.  About 3 P.M. he had seen a feeble attack on the Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and Pender, and about the same time he received information of Longstreet’s success.

Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the high banks of the Richmond road, and the approach of his reserves, plainly visible from the Confederate position, seemed to presage a renewed attack.  “I waited some time,” says Jackson, “to receive it, but he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself.  The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt.  In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled to retire, it would be under cover of the night."* (* Jackson’s Reports, O.R. volume 21 page 634.)

Jackson’s decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, or rather by the reports which Stuart, who had sent out staff officers to keep the closest watch on the enemy’s movements, had been able to furnish of the demoralised condition of a great part of Franklin’s force.  The cavalry general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in person, galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, and a message was at once sent to Lee, requesting permission for an advance.  A single cannon shot was to be the signal for a general attack, which Stuart, striking the enemy in flank, was to initiate with his two brigades and the lighter guns.

“Returning to our position,” to quote Stuart’s chief of staff, “we awaited in anxious silence the desired signal; but minute after minute passed by, and the dark veil of the winter night began to envelop the valley, when Stuart, believing that the summons agreed upon had been given, issued the order to advance.  Off we went into the gathering darkness, our sharpshooters driving their opponents easily before them, and Pelham with his guns, pushing ahead at a trot, giving them a few shots whenever the position seemed favourable, and then again pressing forward.  This lasted about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy’s infantry began to be more and more destructive, and other fresh batteries opened upon us.  Still all remained silent upon our main line.  Our situation had become, indeed, a critical one, when a courier from General Jackson galloped up at full speed, bringing the order for Stuart to retreat as quickly as he could to his original position.”