“As long as General Jackson,” wrote Lee to the Secretary of War on November 10, “can operate with safety, and secure his retirement west of the Massanutton Mountains, I think it advantageous that he should be in a position to threaten the enemy’s flank and rear, and thus prevent his advance southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge.  General Jackson has been directed accordingly, and should the enemy descend into the Valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear, and cut off his communications.  The enemy apparently is so strong in numbers that I think it preferable to baffle his designs by manoeuvring, rather than resist his advance by main force, To accomplish the latter without too great a risk and loss would require more than double our present numbers."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 711.)

His letter to Jackson, dated November 9, ran as follows:  “The enemy seems to be massing his troops along the Manassas Railroad in the vicinity of Piedmont, which gives him great facilities for bringing up supplies from Alexandria.  It has occurred to me that his object may be to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept your ascent of the Valley...This would oblige you to cross into the Lost River Valley, or west of it, unless you could force a passage through the Blue Ridge; hence my anxiety for your safety.  If you can prevent such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly on his flank and rear through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly in my opinion effect the object you propose.  A demonstration of crossing into Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might call him back to the Potomac.  As my object is to retard and baffle his designs, if it can be accomplished by manoeuvring your corps as you propose, it will serve my purpose as well as if effected in any other way.  With this understanding, you can use your discretion, which I know I can rely upon, in remaining or advancing up the Valley.  Keep me advised of your movements and intentions; and you must keep always in view the probability of an attack upon Richmond from either north or south, when a concentration of force will become necessary."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 705.)

Jackson’s plan, however, was not destined to be tried.  McClellan had issued orders for the concentration of his army at Warrenton.  His troops had never been in better condition.  They were in good spirits, well supplied and admirably equipped.  Owing to the activity of his cavalry, coupled with the fact that the Confederate horses were at this time attacked by a disease which affected both tongue and hoof, his information was more accurate than usual.  He knew that Longstreet was at Culpeper, and Jackson in the Valley.  He saw the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy’s forces, and of either defeating Longstreet or forcing him to fall back to Gordonsville, and he had determined to make the attempt.