communications troubled.  But as to the wisdom of giving battle on the Antietam, after the fall of Harper’s Ferry, there was no divergence of opinion between Lee and his lieutenant.  They had no reason to respect the Union army as a weapon of offence, and very great reason to believe that McClellan was incapable of wielding it.  Their anticipations were well founded.  The Federal attack was badly designed and badly executed.  If it be compared with the German attack at Worth, the defects of McClellan, the defects of his subordinates, the want of sound training throughout the whole army, become at once apparent.  On August 6, 1870, there was certainly, early in the day, much disjointed fighting, due in great part to the difficulties of the country, the absence of the Crown Prince, and the anxiety of the generals to render each other loyal support.  But when once the Commander-in-Chief appeared upon the field, and, assuming direction of the battle, infused harmony into the operations, the strength and unity of the attack could hardly have been surpassed.  Almost at the same moment 30,000 men were launched against McMahon’s front, 25,000 against his right, and 10,000 against his left.  Every battalion within sound of the cannon participated in the forward movement; and numerous batteries, crossing the stream which corresponds with the Antietam, supported the infantry at the closest range.  No general hesitated to act on his own responsibility.  Everywhere there was co-operation, between infantry and artillery, between division and division, between army corps and army corps; and such co-operation, due to a sound system of command, is the characteristic mark of a well-trained army and a wise leader.  At Sharpsburg, on the other hand, there was no combination whatever, and even the army corps commanders dared not act without specific orders.  There was nothing like the close concert and the aggressive energy which had carried the Southerners to victory at Gaines’ Mill and the Second Manassas.  The principle of mutual support was utterly ignored.  The army corps attacked in succession and not simultaneously, and in succession they were defeated.  McClellan fought three separate battles, from dawn to 10 A.M. against Lee’s left; from 10 A.M. to 1 P.M. against his centre; from 1 to 4 P.M. against his right.  The subordinate generals, although, with a few exceptions, they handled their commands skilfully, showed no initiative, and waited for orders instead of improving the opportunity.  Only two-thirds of the army was engaged; 25,000 men hardly fired a shot, and from first to last there was not the slightest attempt at co-operation.  McClellan was made aware by his signallers on the Red Hill of every movement that took place in his opponent’s lines, and yet he was unable to take advantage of Lee’s weakness.  He had still to grasp the elementary rule that the combination of superior numbers and of all arms against a single point is necessary to win battles.