The soldiers knew better.  They had been close enough to the enemy’s lines to learn for themselves how thin was the force which manned them.  They were perfectly well aware that they had been held in check by inferior numbers, and that the battle on the Antietam, tactically speaking, was no more of a victory for the North than Malvern Hill had been for the South.  From dawn to dark on September 18 they had seen the tattered colours and bright bayonets of the Confederates still covering the Sharpsburg ridge; they had seen the grey line, immovable and defiant, in undisputed possession of the battle-ground, while their own guns were silent and their own generals reluctant to renew the fight.  Both the Government and the people expected McClellan to complete his success by attacking Lee in Virginia.  The Confederates, it was said—­and men based their opinions on McClellan’s reports—­had been heavily defeated, not only at Antietam, but also at South Mountain; and although the Army of the Potomac might be unfit for protracted operations, the condition of the enemy must necessarily be far worse.

Such arguments, however, were entirely inapplicable to the situation.  The Confederates had not been defeated at all, either at South Mountain or Sharpsburg; and although they had eventually abandoned their positions they had suffered less than their opponents.  The retreat, however, across the Potomac had undoubtedly shaken their morale.  “In a military point of view,” wrote Lee to Davis on September 25, “the best move, in my opinion, the army could make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and endeavour to defeat the enemy at that point.  I would not hesitate to make it even with our diminished numbers did the army exhibit its former temper and condition, but, as far as I am able to judge, the hazard would be great and reverse disastrous."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 627.) But McClellan was not more cheerful.  “The army,” he said on the 27th, “is not now in a condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary.”  So far from thinking of pursuit, he thought only of the defence of the Potomac, apprehending a renewed attempt to enter Maryland, and by no means over-confident that the two army corps which he had at last sent to Harper’s Ferry would be able to maintain their position if attacked.* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 70.) Nor were the soldiers more eager than their commander to cross swords with their formidable enemy.  “It would be useless,” says General G.H.  Gordon, who now commanded a Federal division, “to deny that at this period there was a despondent feeling in the army,” and the Special Correspondents of the New York newspapers, the ‘World’ and ‘Tribune,’ confirm the truth of this statement.  But the clearest evidence as to the condition of the troops is furnished in the numerous reports which deal with straggling.  The vice had reached a pitch which is almost inconceivable.  Thousands and tens of thousands, Federals as well as Confederates, were absent from their commands.