“For many years I never fully understood my mission that day, or why I was sent to General Jackson.  When Jackson’s report was published of the battle, I saw that he stated, that on the afternoon of September 17, General Lee had ordered him to move to the left with a view of turning the Federal right, but that he found the enemy’s numerous artillery so judiciously posted in their front, and so near the river, as to render such an attempt too hazardous to undertake.  I afterwards saw General J.E.B.  Stuart’s report, in which he says that it was determined, the enemy not attacking, to turn the enemy’s right on the 18th.  It appears General Lee ordered General Jackson, on the evening of the 17th, to turn the enemy’s right, and Jackson said that it could not be done.  It also appears from Stuart’s report, and from the incident I relate, that General Lee reiterated the order on the 18th, and told Jackson to take fifty guns, and crush the Federal right.  Jackson having reported against such attempt on the 17th, no doubt said that if an artillerist, in whom General Lee had confidence, would say the Federal right could be crushed with fifty guns, he would make the attempt.

“I now have the satisfaction of knowing that the opinion which I was forced to give on September 18 had already been given by Jackson on the evening of September 17, and that the same opinion was reiterated by him on September 18, and confirmed by General J. E. B. Stuart on the same day.  I still believe that Jackson, Stuart, and myself were right, and that the attempt to turn the Federal right either on the 17th or on the 18th would have been unwise.

“The incident shows General Lee’s decision and boldness in battle, and General Jackson’s delicate loyalty to his commanding general, in convincing him of the inadvisability of a proposed movement, which he felt it would be hazardous to undertake."* (* Communicated to the author.  The difficulties in the way of the attack, of which Jackson was aware on the night of the 17th, probably led to his advising retreat when Lee asked his opinion at the conference (ante pages 259, 260).) The Federal left, protected by the Antietam, was practically inaccessible; and on receiving from the artillery officers’ lips the confirmation of Jackson’s report, Lee was fain to relinquish all hope of breaking McClellan’s line.  The troops, however, remained in line of battle; but during the day information came in which made retreat imperative.  The Federals were being reinforced.  Humphrey’s division, hitherto held back at Frederick by orders from Washington, had marched over South Mountain; Couch’s division, which McClellan had left to observe Harper’s Ferry, had been called in; and a large force of militia was assembling on the Pennsylvania border.  Before evening, therefore, Lee determined to evacuate his position, and during the night the Army of Northern Virginia, with all its trains and artillery, recrossed the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford.