The stroke against the centre was not, however, to be tried.  Lee had other views, and Jackson had been already ordered to turn the Federal right.  Stuart, reinforced by a regiment of infantry and several light batteries, was instructed to reconnoitre the enemy’s position, and if favourable ground were found, he was to be supported by all the infantry available.  “About half-past twelve,” says General Walker, “I sought Jackson to report that from the front of my position in the wood I thought I had observed a movement of the enemy, as if to pass through the gap where I had posted Colonel Cooke’s two regiments.  I found Jackson in rear of Barksdale’s brigade, under an apple tree, sitting on his horse, with one leg thrown carelessly over the pommel of his saddle, plucking and eating the fruit.  Without making any reply to my report, he asked me abruptly:  “Can you spare me a regiment and a battery?"...Adding that he wished to make up, from the different commands on our left, a force of four or five thousand men, and give them to Stuart, with orders to turn the enemy’s right and attack him in the rear; that I must give orders to my division to advance to the front, and attack the enemy as soon as I should hear Stuart’s guns, and that our whole left wing would move to the attack at the same time.  Then, replacing his foot in the stirrup, he said with great emphasis, “We’ll drive McClellan into the Potomac.”

“Returning to my command, I repeated General Jackson’s order to my brigade commanders and directed them to listen to the sound of Stuart’s guns.  We all confidently expected to hear the welcome sound by two o’clock at least, and as that hour approached every ear was on the alert.  Napoleon at Waterloo did not listen more intently for the sound of Grouchy’s fire than did we for Stuart’s.  Two o’clock came, but nothing was heard of Stuart.  Half-past two, and then three, and still Stuart made no sign.

“About half-past three a staff officer of General Longstreet’s brought me an order to advance and attack the enemy in my front.  As the execution of this order would have materially interfered with Jackson’s plans, I thought it my duty before beginning the movement to communicate with General Longstreet personally.  I found him in rear of the position in which I had posted Cooke in the morning, and upon informing him of Jackson’s intentions, he withdrew his order.

“While we were discussing this subject, Jackson himself joined us with the information of Stuart’s failure to turn the Federal right, for the reason that he found it securely posted on the Potomac.  Upon my expressing surprise at this statement, Jackson replied that he also had been surprised, as he had supposed the Potomac much further away; but he remarked that Stuart had an excellent eye for topography, and it must be as he represented.  “It is a great pity,” he added; “we should have driven McClellan into the Potomac""* (* Battles and Leaders. volume 2 pages 679 and 680.)