Still further to the south, however, the battle blazed out at one o’clock with unexpected fury.  The Federal attack, recoiling first from Jackson and then from Longstreet, swung round to the Confederate right; and it seemed as if McClellan’s plan was to attempt each section of Lee’s line in succession.  Burnside had been ordered to force the passage of the bridge at nine o’clock, but either the difficulty of the task, or his inexperience in handling troops on the offensive, delayed his movements; and when the attack was made, it was fiercely met by four Confederate brigades.  At length, well on in the afternoon, three Federal divisions crowned the spur, and, driving Longstreet’s right before them, made good their footing on the ridge.  Sharpsburg was below them; the Southern infantry, outflanked and roughly handled, was falling back in confusion upon the town; and although Lee had assembled a group of batteries in the centre, and regiments were hurrying from the left, disaster seemed imminent.  But strong assistance was at hand.  A.P.  Hill, who had forded the Potomac and crossed the Antietam by the lower bridge, after a forced march of seventeen miles in eight hours from Harper’s Ferry,* (* Hill received his orders at 6.30 A.M. and marched an hour later, reaching the battle-field about 3.30 P.M.) attacked without waiting for orders, and struck the Federals in flank with 3000 bayonets.  By this brilliant counterstroke Burnside was repulsed and the position saved.

Northern writers have laid much stress on this attack.  Had Burnside displayed more, or A.P.  Hill less, energy, the Confederates, they assert, could hardly have escaped defeat.  It is certainly true that Longstreet’s four brigades had been left to bear the brunt of Burnside’s assault without further support than could be rendered by the artillery.  They were not so left, however, because it was impossible to aid them.  Jackson’s and Longstreet’s troops, despite the fiery ordeal through which they had passed, were not yet powerless, and the Confederate leaders were prepared for offensive tactics.  A sufficient force to sustain the right might have been withdrawn from the left and centre; but Hill’s approach was known, and it was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means for a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank.  Early in the afternoon Longstreet had given orders for an advance.  Hood’s division, with full cartridge-boxes, had reappeared upon the field.  Jones’ and Lawton’s divisions were close behind; the batteries had replenished their ammunition, and if Longstreet was hardly warranted in arranging a general counter-attack on his own responsibility, he had at least full confidence in the ability of the troops to execute it.  “It seemed probable,” he says, “that by concealing our movements under cover of the (West) wood, we could draw our columns so near to the enemy to the front that we would have but a few rods to march to mingle our ranks with his; that our columns, massed in goodly numbers, and pressing heavily upon a single point, would give the enemy much trouble and might cut him in two, breaking up his battle arrangements at Burnside Bridge."* (* From Manassas to Appomattox pages 256, 257.)