reserve set free for the counterstroke.  The great drawback was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, would permit McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful artillery, and in no place did the range exceed two thousand yards.  In case of retreat, moreover, the Potomac, two hundred yards from shore to shore, would have to be crossed by a few deep fords,* (* Two fords, behind the left and centre, were examined by Major Hotchkiss during the battle by Jackson’s order, and were reported practicable for infantry.) of which only one was practicable for waggons.  These disadvantages, however, it was impossible to avoid; and if the counterstroke were decisive, they would not be felt.

The left of the position was assigned to Jackson, with Hood in third line.  Next in order came D.H.  Hill.  Longstreet held the centre and the right, with Walker in reserve behind the flank.  Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade and his four guns, was between the West Wood and the Potomac.  Munford’s two regiments of cavalry, reinforced by a battery, held the bridge at the Antietam Iron-works, and kept open the communication with Harper’s Ferry; and twenty-six rifled pieces of the reserve artillery were with D.H.  Hill.  From the Nicodemus Run to the bluff overhanging the Burnside Bridge is just three miles, and for the occupation of this front the following troops were at Lee’s disposal:—­

Men Guns

Jackson:  5,500 16*
    Jones’ Division.. 
    Ewell’s Division (General Lawton)

(* The majority of Jackson’s guns appear to have been left behind the team.  Having broken down, at Harper’s Ferry.)

Longstreet: 
    D.R.  Jones’ Division
    Hood’s Division (detached to Jackson)
    Evans’ Brigade. 8,000 50

D.H.  Hill’s Division.                        5,000   26
Walker’s Division.                           3,500   12

Stuart: 
    Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade. 
    Munford’s Brigade. 2,500 4

Reserve Artillery                                1,000   26
------  ---
25,500  134

On the far side of the Potomac the Shepherdstown Ford was protected by the remainder of the reserve artillery, with an infantry escort; but so small was the force whose retreat was thus secured that nearly every man was required in the fighting-line.  Except the divisions of Hood and Walker, 5500 men all told, there was no immediate reserve.

But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had been left at Harper’s Ferry were rapidly coming up.  McLaws and Anderson, who had started before midnight, were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton’s cavalry brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dispatched to A.P.  Hill.  But could these 13,000 bayonets be up in time-before Hooker and Mansfield received strong support, or before the